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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study’s primary focus is to determine if the White House press corps acted 
more deferential to President Bush and his agenda after September 11, 2001, and if so, to 
see how long the period of decreased adversarial relations lasted.  This purpose is 
accomplished through a content analysis of 37 White House press briefings, conducted 
by then White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, examining press-briefing questions 
three months before, on, directly following, and three months after September 11 
according to four dimensions of adversarial relations: initiative, directness, assertiveness, 
and hostility. Ten question design features comprise the criteria to measure each 
dimension, and ultimately, to measure the degree to which the press acted more 
deferential or adversarial toward Fleischer after the September 11 attacks. 
 Overall, the study’s results show the White House press corps asked similar 
questions before and after September 11.  Though deferent questions soared to the 
sample’s highest levels on September 11, the press corps not only maintained its pre-
September deferential/adversarial relations with Fleischer in the weeks following 
September 11, but it became even more adversarial.  By December 2001, deference 
increased and adversarial relations decreased, but not by more than 10 percent of what 
they were before September 11.  This group of press members, in touch with the highest-
ranking political officials and newsmakers, initiated more direct, assertive, and hostile 
questions following the momentous domestic shakeup of September 11, 2001. 
 Contrary to many reports, this study found the press to be more aggressive than 
normal in their questioning in the two-three weeks following the attacks.  This 
information begs bigger questions, which may serve for continuing areas of study:  If 
members of the White House Press Corps were asking more adversarial questions 
following September 11, why didn’t their increased adversarial tone make it into the 
headlines of national newspapers, broadcasts, and magazines?  Is there a correlation 
between questions the media ask sources and what gets into the news?  Does the press 
question’s agenda have any bearing on the news agenda? 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Background Information 
The events of September 11 set “an historic precedent for media cooperation with 
the White House to suppress information” (Lawrence, 2003) when the major news 
networks agreed, per President Bush’s request, to limit using footage of a tape 
supposedly containing hidden messages from bin Laden (Carter & Barringer, 2001,        
p. A1).  Following an October 10, 2001, conference call from National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice, executives of the five major television networks—ABC News, CBS 
News, NBC News, the Cable News Network, and the Fox News Channel—agreed to 
“broadcast only short parts of any tape issued by Al Quaeda and to eliminate any 
passages containing flowery rhetoric urging violence against violence.  They agreed to 
accompany the tapes with reports providing what they called appropriate context.  They 
also agreed to avoid repeatedly showing excerpts from the tapes” (Carter & Barringer,   
p. A1).  Rice did not demand that the networks censor the tapes because “a demand 
would have sparked a backlash by journalists.  A request, however, implicitly recognized 
that the media would make their own choices, while calling on them to use more 
restraint” (Elder, 2001, ¶ 4).   
Does the top network’s compliance with the government’s censorship request 
suggest the press was susceptible to the intense emotion that shocked and temporarily 
united all Americans in a newfound, rallying patriotism, or was it simply responsible 
journalism?  Is there another explanation, or does a combination of many factors best 
explain the media’s behavior?  This study cannot prove the media’s motive for acting as 
they did on and after September 11; however, by testing the extent, if any, to which the 
White House media deviated from the norm of their relationship with White House Press 
Secretary Ari Fleischer following September 11, this thesis entertains and examines 
potential societal consequences of an overtly symbiotic press-government relationship.   
An analysis of media questions from press briefings with Fleischer before, on, and 
after September 11 seeks to determine the extent to which the media’s agenda and the 
president’s agenda were the same after September 11.  Scholars have different opinions 
regarding whether reporters or powerful political officials have more power in setting the 
news agenda.  Measuring the changes in adversarial relations during the press briefings 
can empirically test whether the media behaved deferentially toward Fleischer and 
President Bush’s agenda following September 11.  While September 11 is an extreme 
case in press-president symbiosis, Gaye Tuchman said in “The Exception Proves the 
Rule: The Study of Routine News Practices” that one may learn about the customary 
situation by examining the structure of an exceptional case (1977, p. 43).   
 
 
Primary Research Question and Importance of Research 
 The primary purpose of this study is to answer the following question: Was the 
White House press corps more deferential to President Bush and his agenda post- 
September 11, and if there is evidence of the press corps becoming less adversarial, how 
long did it last?  This research is important to journalism because it facilitates discussion 
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not only on a hot political topic but also on the preservation of Americans’ individual 
freedoms.  “If the media allow politicians to set the public agenda, they may unduly 
narrow public discussion and so diminish democracy” (Schudson, 2003, p. 5).  The social 
importance of this study lies in its analysis of the relationship between the media and 
powerful political sources with the First Amendment freedoms of American citizens.  
The literature review examines the press’s role in democratic society and explores how 
this role affects the news agenda and the availability of information in America’s 
marketplace of ideas.     
 The exploration of this issue is a summary and a continuation of the knowledge 
and thoughts my professors have shared through the political communication curriculum 
at Louisiana State University’s Manship School of Mass Communication.  Of all the 
ideas shared, the importance and necessity of educated debate and informed discussion in 
the maintenance of democracy radiates.  If the media comply with the government and 
fail to report opposing viewpoints or ask unpopular questions for fear of being labeled 
“unpatriotic,” First Amendment freedoms are at risk without the vast public being aware 
of the danger.  This research is one of the first studies conducted using a method 
developed by Clayman and Heritage (2002)1 to measure adversarial levels of journalists’ 
questions during interviews or press conferences.  Unique political, social, and emotional 
circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks present a rare environment to study 
the effects an imbalance in the adversarial relationship between the media and top 
political sources has on the news agenda, and in turn, on a democratic society.     
 From this study, media professionals may better understand the media’s 
adversarial role in determining the news agenda by examining the benefits and losses 
incurred during power shifts between the media and powerful political officials and the 
effects symbiotic news and political agendas have on American democracy.  Media 
professionals can see the effects of the lack of the adversarial relationship when 
complying with the government in extreme situations and have an opportunity to reflect 
on the long-term potential costs of those reporting decisions.  A practical application of 
this thesis would be for the professional community to view patriotism as a potential bias 
in balanced reporting that could endanger the journalism profession’s credibility and 
purpose in American society. 
 
 
Definition of Terms 
Adversarial Relations—“The adversarial aspect of president-press relations is an elusive 
quality, difficult to quantify...However, the adversarial relationship appears to be  a well-
established fact of life” (Kernell, 1997, p. 92).  The adversarial relationship “should pivot 
on an assumed-to-be-abiding conflict of interest between themselves (journalists) and 
politicians.  Journalists should never be ‘in the pockets’ of the latter” (Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 1981, p. 470).  Varying degrees of symbiosis or deference balance the 
adversarial relationship.  
                                                 
1 Two references to Clayman and Heritage works from 2002 are included in this study.  Because their 
article, “Questioning Presidents: Journalistic Deference and Adersarialness in the Press Conferences of 
U.S. Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan,” appears frequently throughout this thesis and is cited as 
“(Clayman & Heritage, 2002).”  Their book, The News Interview, is cited as “(Clayman & Heritage, 2002, 
The News Interview).” 
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Agenda Setting—“The mass media attention to an issue causing that issue to be elevated 
in importance to the public” (Severin & Tankard, 1997, p. 219) and to political elites. 
 
Deference—“Respect and esteem due a superior or an elder; also: affected or ingratiating 
regard for another's wishes” (Merriam-Webster Online). 
 
Frames—Ideas supplying a suggested context for news content through the use of 
“selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (Severin & Tankard, 1997, p. 287). 
 
Interviewee—Person being interviewed by the press, referring especially to the president or 
the press secretary. 
 
Powerful Political Actors/Powerful Political Sources—“Individuals who play a role in 
national activities” including “political, economic, social, or cultural figures” or “holders of 
official positions or powers behind thrones who play no official roles” (Gans, 1979, p. 8).  
Political elites are those who speak on behalf of politicians, as opposed to those who speak 
on behalf of the public. 
 
Press Briefing—“An act or instance of giving precise instructions or essential 
information” (Merriam-Webster Online).  White House press briefings are conducted by 
the White House press secretary. 
 
Press Conference—“An interview or announcement given by a public figure to the press 
by appointment” (Merriam-Webster Online).   
 
 
Limitations/ Rationale of Study 
This research is narrowed to focus on differences in the media’s actions before 
September 11, 2001 compared with actions after the event.  Analysis of the content of 
press briefing questions from three months before, on, directly following, and three 
months after September 11 and examining literature and events involving the media’s 
actions prior to and following September 11 provides insights to important questions 
regarding the media’s behavior toward the president following the terrorist attacks.  
Many speculations may be and have been made about post-September 11 media 
patriotism and its threat to democratic society and endangering of the First Amendment.   
This study aims to establish facts regarding behavioral changes in the White House 
media’s relationship with Fleischer following a national crisis and to assert whether the 
media’s behavior changed and for how long in the wake of September 11.   
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CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Overview of Literature Review 
 Understanding the process of negotiating the news establishes a basis for 
understanding how shifts and tensions in the press-powerful political source relationship 
may affect how news is made.  A widely accepted theoretical framework to evaluate 
press-state relations is missing from research literature, (Bennett, 1990, p. 103) but the 
review examines philosophies, models, and methods used to understand more clearly 
how the media and powerful political actors interact with each other.  This study 
specifically examines the role of the question’s agenda in determining adversarial or 
deferential relations in the press-political source relationship.  Because the method for 
examining the question’s agenda is new, available research in this area is limited.  Much 
information is yet to be discovered on the question’s agenda; however, examining what is 
known on agenda setting and media framing theories helps to determine main schools of 
thought from which hypotheses can be made on possible changes in the relationship 
dynamics between the press and powerful political actors following September 11, 2001.  
 Agenda setting deals with who makes the news and provides a context for 
establishing the balance of the press-source relationship and how the news agenda is set.    
Framing theory in this study is used to examine how the media interact with powerful 
political sources in how they frame their questions during press briefings.  Based on a 
study by Clayman and Heritage (2002), specific frames in the delivery of press questions 
may indicate adversarial relations and/or deference between the press and powerful 
political sources.  While most literature deals with frames within the text of news 
material, this study looks at phrases within sentences to measure the effects of question 
frames on the press-source relationship.  To understand further the media’s relationship 
with powerful political sources, it is necessary to examine the press’s role in American 
democratic society.  If changes in media behavior occur following September 11, the 
meaning of these changes is not significant without knowledge of press role ideologies as 
well as realities about the media’s purpose in the United States today.  A massive national 
crisis like September 11 may account for unifying, patriotic rallying behavior between 
many groups of individuals (Mueller, 1973), and this review examines the crisis 
phenomenon and its potential effects on the press-source relationship after September 11.   
 
 
Agenda Setting 
  In the process of news negotiation, sources and press members establish agendas, 
which are lists of items, issues, or ideas by order of importance, “with the most important 
at the top” (Severin & Tankard, 1997, p. 240).  Agenda setting is “a casual hypothesis 
suggesting that media content has an influence on the public perception of the importance 
of issues” (Severin & Tankard, p. 229).  The media-powerful political source interaction 
dynamic, which is thought to determine issue salience, public opinion, and the news 
agenda, is a popular research focus.  Does the president influence the media’s agenda or 
do the media influence the president’s agenda?  Where does public opinion specifying 
what issues Americans deem important fit into the equation?   
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 The media are able to facilitate the agenda-setting function through repeated news 
coverage, which raises the issue or event’s awareness and importance in the public’s 
mind.  All news events, however, are not created or reported equally, and different news 
events and issues affect agenda setting in different ways.  Powerful executive officials 
have a “fundamental advantage” in dealing with the media because “their activities sit so 
high on the media’s agenda of subjects to cover” (Grossman & Rourke, 1976, p. 457).  
This gives powerful political actors agenda-setting power by putting them in positions to 
exchange news for publicity (Grossman & Rourke).  Agenda setting as an outcome of 
media-source interaction also raises questions about how or if public opinion and 
democratic values are represented in the public news agenda (Herbst, 1998).   
  
 
The Media Agenda and The President’s Agenda 
 The media’s coverage of news and the questions they ask their sources during 
unique events like September 11 may have a greater impact on the public than in ordinary 
times.  Agenda setting is most successful when individual audience members process and 
evaluate the information and are able to identify with and retain the information.    
Yagade and Dozier (1990) found abstract issues like the federal budget deficit and the 
nuclear arms race are less likely to affect agenda setting because they are conceptually 
more difficult for the public to visualize than are concrete issues like drug abuse and 
energy.  Emotion-evoking issues and issues individuals feel personally can affect their 
immediate environments and have a high chance of dominating the news agenda because 
they are easier for the public to comprehend and gain interest.  If the public feels strongly 
about and gains interest in an issue of which the public know little, however, it will 
depend more on the media for information (Zucker, 1978).   
 When highly visible events occur and spawn issues demanding government 
attention, the public agenda more easily is set because the issue’s salience in the news 
makes it a priority for both the media and the government.  Because of the relevancy and 
the uncertainness surrounding the terrorist attacks on September 11, the public have a 
higher need for orientation and are more susceptible to agenda-setting effects (Weaver, 
1977).  With individuals at the mercy of their television sets and daily newspapers for 
information, the media have great power and responsibility in reporting.  The media’s 
news, however, is contingent on the information they receive from the White House and 
other authorized sources.   
 “One very likely choice for an influence on the media agenda is the president of 
the United States.  He is the number one newsmaker in the country and has a capability of 
getting his message into mass communication not available to many others” (Severin & 
Tankard, 1997, p. 233).  Even though the president’s message is likely to be directly 
influential to a mass audience, the media play an important role in elevating the 
message’s importance on the agenda through repetition and exposure.  Wanta and Miller 
(1995) conducted an experiment to see if the president’s or the press’s agenda left a 
greater impression on a public audience.  The team analyzed issues President Clinton 
stressed in one of his State of the Union addresses and also analyzed issues the media 
stressed about the address after it aired.  Wanta and Miller asked respondents to answer a 
questionnaire regarding the event and the event coverage.  The research team concluded 
combined exposure to the president’s speech and the media coverage increased the 
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agenda-setting effect, but they speculate the president needs the media to explain his 
issues to the public for the issues to resonate as salient in the public’s mind.  They also 
found the public is most likely understand and support the news agenda when it thinks 
the media are credible and when they believe the president is doing a good job in his 
leadership role.   “The president actually needs the media to further highlight and explain 
the issues that he deems important” (Severin & Tankard, 1997, p. 235).  The media, in 
turn, need the president to have information to report.  “The news media do not just 
passively transmit information, reporting verbatim the words of a public official or 
conveying exactly the incidents at an event” (McCombs & Bell, 1996, p. 93).   
 The often mutual dependence between the White House and the press makes it 
necessary for the media and powerful political actors to form deferential relationships 
with each other.  In the case of September 11, a small number of elite reporters 
comprising the White House press corps had direct access to the latest information 
through Fleischer’s press briefings.  “One of the important influences on the media 
agenda suggested by recent research is the content of other media” (Severin & Tankard, 
1997, p. 232).  Elite media, like the White House press corps, set the agenda for news 
outlets across the country and for many outlets worldwide.  Aside from direct reports 
from the president, the American public was dependent on the media for information 
regarding terrorist threats and events, giving the media power over a public desperate for 
news.   
  
 
Public Opinion and Indexing 
To aid in building a theoretical framework in press-government relations, Bennett 
(1990) said it is first important to decide how the media should represent the range of 
public debate in news.  Bennett proposed guidelines for press-state relations to establish a 
“generally accepted sense of how the range of public debate ought to be represented in 
the news” (p. 104).  These guidelines include the press granting government the primary 
voice in the news unless a majority of the public disagrees with the voice.  Bennett’s 
“indexing theory” is the process by which credible sources are determined by journalists.  
“Modern public opinion can be thought of as an ‘index’ constructed from the distribution 
of dominant institutional voices as recorded in the mass media.”  The media have helped 
create an upside-down American democracy in which “governments are able to define 
their own publics and where ‘democracy’ becomes whatever the government ends up 
doing”  (Bennett, p. 125).   
The public plays a role in influencing news selection and issue salience, and it has 
a hand in deciphering the relative agenda-shaping authority of powerful political actors 
versus the media.  The public’s voice, when represented loudly, coherently, and in large 
numbers, can aid in setting the agenda.  The repetitive news coverage media afford elite 
actors like President Bush is an alternative approach to measure issue salience, which 
means Bush’s position as president alone has the power to push his causes to the 
frontlines of national news (Epstein and Segal, 2000).  Another view suggests the media 
create public opinion more than they represent it.  Herbst (1998) said the agenda-setting 
models in research literature are troubling because they separate the media and the public 
for analytical purposes, whereas in political circles, the two are thought of together.  “The 
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phenomena of public opinion and mass media are largely conflated...and difficult to pull 
apart, either theoretically or practically” (Herbst, p. 5).    
The dialogue the media generate depends on what the media report and reiterate 
through repetitive news coverage.  Dialogue gives the media power in shaping the views 
of individuals.  “There is evidence that the media are shaping people’s views of the major 
problems facing society and that the problems emphasized in the media may not be the 
ones that are dominant in reality” (Severin & Tankard, 1997, p. 239).  The number of 
daily news events is too large for each person to follow individually, so the media’s 
decisions about what news to report often becomes the news that is important.   “The 
media’s daily reports alert us to the latest events and changes in the larger world beyond 
our reach.  Consequently, most of our world is a second-hand reality created by the news 
organizations” (McCombs, 1996, p. 93).  Journalists limit the ranges of opinion and 
expression in the news for three reasons:  they obtain information through their primary 
sources, which often are high government officials; professional journalism operating 
norms constrain expression; and journalists tend to be educated upper-middle class 
citizens with common opinions (Schudson, 2003, p. 3). 
 Regarding the relevancy of public opinion in the agenda-setting process, Herbst 
(1998) said many political actors and journalists think the public is ignorant about 
important political issues and events.  Favorable public opinion polls support powerful 
political actors’ causes and reputations, but reporters and politicians rely on lobbyist 
groups or quantitative measures for a more accurate representation of public opinion.  
Walter Lippmann (1928) argued it is an “unworkable fiction” to assume the public is 
capable of absorbing the perplexities of world affairs.  A collective public opinion is 
difficult to achieve because information barriers and press control of news exposure 
impede people from comprehending the vast amount of information needed to form an 
accurate public opinion.  For this reason, Lippmann believes democracy is unattainable.  
Shaw and Martin (1992) suggested agenda setting allows the media to provide enough 
agreement on issues salient to the public to permit dialogue between conflicting views.  
“In this sense, agenda setting serves as a consensus-building device that permits 
democracy to work” (Severin & Tankard, 1997, p. 239).   
 
 
Framing  
 Within the agenda setting theory, the theory of media framing plays a part in 
evaluating the media’s relationship with powerful political sources.  Typically referring 
to how the media organize and supply news content to the public, framing theory may 
help to understand how news is processed by the public (Bleske, 1995).  In most agenda-
setting studies since the early 1970s, the media agenda and the public agenda consisted of 
public issues portrayed as set objects   (McCombs & Bell, 1996).  McCombs and Bell 
said, “Public issues are not the only set of objects.  Communication is a process.  It [the 
agenda] can be about any set of objects—or even a single object—competing for 
attention” (p. 105).  Each of these objects has many possible attributes, or frames, varying 
in issue salience.  The objects and the frames used “for thinking about those objects are 
powerful agenda setting roles” (McCombs & Bell, p. 106).  Entman (2003) defined 
framing as the “central process by which government officials and journalists exercise 
political influence over each other and over the public” (p. 417).  Entman said successful 
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political communication requires “the framing of events, issues, and actors in ways that 
promote perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side while hindering the other” 
(p. 417).  Examining framing issues may lead to a better understanding of president-press 
relations. 
 The concept of media framing presents a new way to study the paradigm of media 
“objectivity and bias” (Hackett, 1984).  Framing broadens and complicates a seemingly 
narrow issue.  Instead of a news story having an obvious negative or positive spin, 
framing may “have more subtle—and powerful—influences on audiences than bias in 
news stories” (Severin & Tankard, 1997, p. 278).  Frames define problems, diagnose 
causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies, and each of the four frame 
functions may be defined within text by a sentence or more (Entman, 1993).  Since 
framing involves issue salience and selection (Entman), this study entertains frames as 
being powerful agenda influences in press questions as well as in news stories.  Since 
news content and agenda forming stem from the relationships between media and 
powerful political actors, a more adversarial relationship between the two may lead to a 
shift in topic salience, which may redirect the news agenda. 
  
 
The Question’s Agenda 
 Before the media direct news frames at an audience to further their agenda-setting 
influence on the public, the media have a preliminary agenda: the question’s agenda 
(Clayman & Heritage, 2002, p. 750).  The question’s agenda is the agenda of the 
interview, which may become the agenda of the news.  Clayman and Heritage (2002, The 
News Interview) claim the interviewer’s, or reporter’s, questions set agendas for 
interviewees by three features of question design.  “Questions set agendas by identifying 
a specific topical domain as the appropriate or relevance domain of response” (Clayman 
& Heritage, The News Interview, p. 196).   They also set agendas by identifying the topic 
of a question’s response and indicating certain actions the interviewee should take in 
answering the question in relation to its topic.  Third, questions facilitate the agenda-
setting function involving decisions about how broad or narrow the interviewee’s 
response should be (p. 198).  Clayman & Heritage’s (2002) study identifies 10 question 
design features influencing agenda setting and the question’s agenda, which are the focus 
of this thesis’s method and subject matter.   
 In interviews and press conferences, “the question’s agenda is derived 
straightforwardly from the President’s own previous remarks” (Clayman & Heritage, 
2002, p. 750).   The question’s agenda is framed to evoke a particular response from the 
interviewee and may exhibit neutral, deferential, or adversarial content.  Differences in 
press questions are often intuitively apparent but difficult to reliably measure.  Clayman 
and Heritage devised a method to facilitate systematic comparisons of how journalists 
treat the president and other powerful political actors in news conferences and interviews.  
Measuring formal aspects of question design, the framing-defining elements of 
“selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, 
Bliss, & Ghanem, 1991) provide evidence of how the question’s agenda affects civility in 
the press-source relationship. 
 Clayman and Heritage (2002) found through measuring press-conference 
questions of Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan that reporters’ adversarial questions 
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increased with time and penetrated even the highest political office.  Though little is 
known about what caused a decrease in deferential press questions over decades of 
presidential press conferences, their study shows,   “the rise of adversarialness has 
transformed the presidential press conference into a formidable instrument of political 
accountability” (Clayman & Heritage, p. 772).  Further research into this “domain of 
interaction” of the phenomenon of face-to-face adversarial interaction between journalists 
and powerful political actors may determine what events and issues cause adversarial 
relations in journalism and shifts in the press-source relationship.  At the time Clayman 
and Heritage published their study, there were “as yet no systematic comparative or 
historical studies of news interviews or press conferences that bear on this [adversarial] 
phenomenon” (p. 752).  
Clayman and Heritage (2002) said much research has been conducted on 
presidential press conferences and evolving president-press relations, however, “much of 
this research focuses less on the substance of what actually transpires within press 
conferences in favor of the institutional conditions under which they occur” (p. 752).  The 
research team analyzed social norms and practices that are evident in news interviews 
and built journalism questioning research to form their innovative method.  “The 
adversarial aspect of the presidential-press relations is an elusive quality, difficult to 
quantify, and the systematic evidence on the subject is inconclusive” (Kernell, 1997, p. 
92).  Smith (1990) agreed there is little methodic evidence to demonstrate the relationship 
between media and elite sources.  Clayman and Heritage’s study is important and unique 
because it quantifies adversarial content as a reflection of adversarial press-president 
relations.  Because there are no official rules and few accepted guidelines for establishing 
how policy makers and reporters relate to and use one another, Bennett (1990) said the 
best way to study press-state relations is to study their overt actions.  Clayman & 
Heritage’s method, which guides this thesis, provides a method that may be used to 
construct a theory for how the press and powerful political actors relate to one another.   
   
 
Cascading Activation Model in Foreign News Reporting 
 Entman (2003) advanced the concept of framing with a new model of the 
relationship between media and government in foreign policy making.  The cascading 
activation model explains how frames activated by the White House administration either 
spread through the rest of the system or are contested by it.  Frames begin with the White 
House and cascade down to link nonadministration political elites (other elites), the 
media, the text produced by the media (news frames), and finally the public. On the 
upswing, the public goes through the media to spread its ideas to the administration, and 
news frames capture the attention of other elites, who bring them to the administration’s 
attention.  Entman exemplifies the remarks President Bush made after September 11, 
defining the attacks in “simple and emotional terms as an ‘act of war’ and identified its 
clear cause as an ‘enemy’ that was ‘evil’” (p. 415).  The administration’s repetition of 
these terms was its framing strategy to “unite” the country in the wake of September 11 
in the administration’s solution: a “war” against terrorism and military intervention in 
Afghanistan. 
 The success of gaining public support depended on the public’s acceptance of 
Bush’s emotional and compelling frames, “war,” “evil,” and “enemy,” which 
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“overwhelmingly dominated in the news” (Entman, 2003).  These terms paired with 
repeated media reports and images of the World Trade Center bombing and collapse 
provided for high magnitude, high resonance framing (Entman, p. 417).  “The 
atmosphere of patriotism of compassion created and/or reinforced by the repeated 
showing of these images may have had traumatic consequences in the media...by severely 
limiting, if not completely suppressing, plurality of media opinion in the weeks following 
the attacks.  This phenomenon appears to have particularly affected mainstream 
American media” (Loersch, 2001, p. 32).        
 The elite opposition publicly supported the president’s plans in Afghanistan and 
joined in his fight against the “axis of evil.”  According to the cascading activation 
model, the job of contesting the president is now left to the media.  Influential foreign 
affairs columnist Thomas Friedman (2001a, 2001b) wrote two essays for the New York 
Times, based on a more extensive article by Hersh (2002), raising questions about Saudi 
Arabia’s links to terrorism to contest the administration’s stance that the Saudis are 
American allies.  A content analysis of the Nexis domestic “Major Papers” library 
showed from October 1 through November 30, 2001, mentions of the terms “Saudi” and 
“terrorism/terrorist” within five words of each other got only 110 hits.  The national 
media failed to pick up the story and “the counterframe did not spread across America’s 
news” (Entman, 2003, p. 425).  Because counterframes did not “activate and diffuse on 
the news pages and in television news,” the vast public did not respond to the story, and 
elites, not feeling the pressure of a widely accepted counterframe, did not feel pressure to 
change their views.         
 “The attacks of September 11, 2001, gave the second President Bush an 
opportunity to propound a line designed to revive habits of patriotic deference, to dampen 
elite dissent, dominate the media texts, and reduce the threat of negative public reaction” 
(Entman, 2003, p. 424).  Saudi Arabia frames do not “prove” the validity of Entman’s 
cascading activation model.  Entman’s research findings support this thesis’s hypothesis 
of a majority of adversarial press questions being foreign policy questions.  Because elite 
dissent from the president is needed to give the media a reason to be adversarial toward 
the president’s agenda, a majority of adversarial press questions are hypothesized to 
reference opinions of Congress members in opposition to the administration.  
 
Adversarial and Deferential Relations in Press-Source Relationships   
 Every productive relationship between reporters and their sources is 
simultaneously adversarial and symbiotic, with a mixture of benefit and cost, adversary 
and exchange, stability and caution (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1981, p. 483).  The adversarial 
exchange between policy makers and reporters keeps both groups alert and watchful of 
their interests, while maintaining a deferential-enough rapport to do their jobs 
productively.  A mutual interest-serving press-source relationship provides a more 
reasonable expectation of media-political actor bond than the view of the press and 
president as adversaries.  Grossman and Rourke’s (1976) exchange theory states, “The 
fundamental objective of both executive officials and the media in their exchange 
relationship is to establish a balance of trade that will be favorable to them” (p. 456).  The 
exchange theory allows for more cooperation and collaboration than an adversarial 
relationship and accounts for fluctuation in the relationship.  Kernell (1997) refers to this 
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exchange as bargaining. Blumler and Gurevitch built on Grossman and Rourke’s 
findings: 
 When more cooperation between the two sides is observed, the reason must lie in 
 the enlarged area of benefit that each expects to enjoy through collaboration with 
 the other.  If, on the other hand, cooperation declines and conflict increases, this is 
 because the perceived benefits of withholding collaboration now outweigh the 
 previous advantages of going along with what the other had proposed or was 
 prepared to accept (p. 473). 
 In societies with competitive democracies, relationships between media and 
sources depend on a balance of power and “divergent interpretations of the media-source 
power balance lie at the heart of diametrically opposed views of the sociopolitical 
functions of mass communications” (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1981, p. 468).  Like Clayman 
and Heritage (2002), Blumler and Gurevitch recognize that media-source relations are 
hard to define.  Contrary schools of thought have scholars debating whether the media are 
subordinate to society’s power holders or are themselves the power holders.   
 Because reporters are dependent on governmental sources for news and, the 
media must nurture source relationships to some extent.  “(Beat reporters) must 
concentrate on stories that please their sources, since angering them may endanger their 
closeness or rapport, thus ending the reporters usefulness on the beat” (Gans, 1979, p. 
133).  Gans said beat reporters, like White House correspondents, must practice self-
censorship to protect their relationships with needed powerful political contacts.  Political 
sources, including the president, also work to maintain congenial relations with the press 
and are dependent on the press to disseminate their message.  The relationship between 
the press and the president is complicated and often a balancing act because they are each 
other’s best friend and worst enemy. 
 
 
Policy Makers and Reporters as Top News Makers    
 Reporters have a considerable advantage over policy makers at shaping and 
packaging news once press events conclude and stories are written and broadcast; 
however, the media, being reliant on their official sources, are still shaping the policy 
makers’ news agenda.  Reporters may choose story angles, omit news from their lineup, 
and favorably or unfavorably frame political actors, and reporters do all of this story 
development based on the information they receive from elite sources.  “News 
organizations are enormously reliant upon government officials and institutions to 
produce that product we call ‘news.’…The range of views available in the news will tend 
to roughly reflect the range of views being advanced by politically powerful news 
sources” (Lawrence, 2003).       
 Presidential administrations and presidents as political actors become more media 
savvy and sophisticated as advancements in technology allow them more opportunities 
for public exposure.  There is pressure for more publicity-oriented presidents like Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush to be strategically wiser about their image than many past 
American presidents because they more than their predecessors routinely appeal directly 
to the public (Kernell, 1997, p. 3).  Kernell said this lessens the need for bargaining, and 
it “rarely includes the kinds of exchanges necessary, in pluralist theory, for the American 
political system to function properly” (p. 3).       
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 The media also are more publicity-oriented and aggressive because they are 
competing with hundreds of other media outlets to get the “scoop” and sell their stories.  
Technological and social advances in journalism and the presidency increase each one’s 
power to try to control the other.  Kernell (1997) said, “Modern presidents are clearly 
opting for more controllable means to communicate their views to the American public” 
(p. 96), either by communicating directly to the public through television speeches or by 
decreasing the importance and number of White House press conferences.  In turn, the 
press is more obtrusive and critical, making it its duty to insure that political actors justify 
and explain their tailored remarks about glossed-over issues.  “Media scholars have 
consistently found that official sources dominate the news” (Schudson, 2003, p. 5).  
Bush’s prestigious leadership position as America’s president and prime policy maker 
demands him a spotlight of media coverage.  According to Lance Bennett’s (1990) 
indexing theory, politicians’ leadership positions and pseudo-celebrity status designate 
them by reporters and the public as credible sources of information for news stories.  
Reporters vie for interviews, attend press conferences, and appear at staged political 
events to capture the moves and the words of powerful political actors.  The more 
important political actors are in official circles, the more intense, frequent, and dramatic 
news coverage they will receive.        
 Other political communication critics and scholars hold different views, believing 
the media to be more than mere messengers of policy maker’s statements.  This 
alternative view acknowledges the media as proactive and influential news-shaping 
participants with as much, if not more, policy-shaping power as the president has.  In 
“The Fourth Branch of Government,” Douglas Cater said careers of top politicians often 
depend on the reporter’s willingness to cover politicians and politicians’ issues favorably.  
“The reporter is the recorder of government but is also a participant.  He[/she] operates in 
a system in which power is divided.  He[/She] as much as anyone, and more than a great 
many, helps to shape the course of government” (1959, p. 7).     
 The media still serve to keep powerful political actors “in check,” and are more 
than mere messengers of policy makers’ statements; they are proactive and influential 
news-shaping participants with policy-shaping power comparable to the high-ranking 
political officials.  Careers of top politicians often depend on the politician’s ability to 
feed information to the press (Cater, 1959, p. 6).  “The reporter is the recorder of 
government but is also a participant.  He[/She] operates in a system in which power is 
divided.  He[/She] as much as anyone, and more than a great many, helps to shape the 
course of government” (Cater, p. 7).   
 
 
Relationship Changes in a National Crisis      
 The results of the cascading activation model from September 11 show the press 
allowed President Bush’s framed messages to dominate the news agenda.  Understanding 
why the press and the public were so vulnerable to his frames may provide more insight 
into shifts in the press-powerful political actor relationship during times of national 
crises.  “As Democrats are fond of pointing out, on September 10, 2001, Bush's approval 
ratings were heading south. The events of September 11 gave him a stature that probably 
will never entirely dissipate, no matter how far down the ‘wrong track’ things get” 
(Halperin, Wilner, & Ambinder, 2003, ¶ 10).  Mueller (1973) found Americans almost 
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invariably rally around their president in times of international crisis and/or threats to 
American interests.           
 A rally effect is “the sudden and substantial increase in public approval of the 
president that occurs in response to certain kinds of dramatic events involving the United 
States” (Hetherington & Nelson, 2003, ¶ 1).  Rally effects are measured by changes in the 
president’s approval polls before the event compared to after the event.  Bush’s rally 
effect lasted longer and was greater than former Presidents Franklin Roosevelt’s approval 
ratings after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, John Kennedy’s ratings after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, and George Bush Sr.’s rise in public approval after the Gulf War (Gregg, 
2003, ¶ 3).  Bush’s “rally boost” ratings climbed an unprecedented 35 points after 
September 11.  His approval ratings in the Gallop Poll soared to 86 percent on September 
15, 2001, from 51 percent on September 10 (Hetherington & Nelson, 2003, ¶ 1).  Until 
then, the greatest polling boost had been 18 points.  Bush’s approval rating increased to 
90 percent on September 22 (Hetherington & Nelson, 2003, ¶ 1), which the highest 
presidential rating ever recorded for a president (Morin, 2001).     
 When a president has a high approval rating, he gains more confidence from the 
American people and experiences less opposition from the press and Congress (Hagar & 
Sullivan, 1994).  “As a president’s professional reputation for competence and success as 
a leader improves, leadership competition within the governing coalition subsides” 
(Hager & Sullivan, p. 1084).  The president, with less opposition from the media and 
other political elites, may use his visibility and reputation to generate presidential support 
and increase his reputation and prestige.  “The public reaction to the recent terrorist 
attacks on U.S. soil provides a textbook example of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect.  No 
longer was Commander in Chief George W. Bush a questionable president with anemic 
approval ratings; instead he has suddenly become the nation’s leader, supported by an 
overwhelming majority of the electorate” (Casey, 2002, ¶ 1).   
 September 11 was the beginning of Bush’s grace period with the media and the 
American public.  “Conscious opinions [of newsmakers] generally change only in the 
wake of highly visible and traumatic events, for positions can then be altered without loss 
of credibility” (Gans, 1979, p. 200).   September 11, for instance, left the nation 
vulnerable and emotionally overwhelmed.  Reporters felt the shock and uncertainties of 
all citizens that had Americans uniting, not trying to cause even more grief.   A more 
deferential and cooperating attitude toward the White House from the press in the wake 
of the event, therefore, would be understandable under the circumstances.  President 
Bush’s sudden rise in public popularity, according to Gans’s theory, is in part because 
journalists changed their opinions of him, or at least curtailed them, after the attacks.  If 
the media changed their actions after September 11, they may have been reacting to 
strings of positive stories written about the president and “responding to opinion change 
among large numbers of peers” (Gans, 1979, p. 200).       
 A national crisis is not the only factor that may contribute to changes in 
adversarial and deferential relations in press-powerful political source relations.  
September 11 is the focal point of this study to measure a change in press briefing 
questions, but the content of some questions may make them naturally more adversarial 
or deferential.  For example, questions referencing the opinion or political stance of a 
Congressional member that differs from the opinion or political stance of the president 
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may make a question tense and may contain more adversarial qualities.  Also, questions 
relating to foreign policy may allow for more adversarial questions. 
 
 
The Reality of an Adversarial Press 
 A purely adversarial press role is impractical and “primarily ideological” 
(Blumler & Gurevitch, 1981) because the media could not get news on a routine basis if 
the source-press relationship was primarily adversarial.  The adversary model of the 
press’s societal role is limited and “cannot provide a comprehensive normative guide to 
journalists’ behavior toward their political sources and contacts” (Blumler & Gurevitch, 
p.471).  As discussed, long-term mutual rivalry would hinder journalists’ daily interaction 
with sources and sustenance of source relationships.  “Perpetual war, hostility, and 
obstruction would only impede each side from the effective pursuit of any constructive 
political communication task” (Blumler & Gurevitch, p. 472). 
 Lawrence (2003) said two main images of the press dominate legal philosophy of 
First Amendment discourse rationalizing press independence: the press as ‘watchdog’ 
and as ‘marketplace of ideas.’  In the watchdog model, the press takes a skeptical and 
adversarial stance, counterbalancing government power by acting as a “fourth branch” of 
government free to scrutinize government on behalf of the people (Lawrence, ¶ 7).  “In 
the marketplace of ideas model, the press must be free to offer a variety of viewpoints to 
the public” (¶ 3).  Lawrence said neither model reflects real-world news practices, and the 
watchdog model even does little to encourage robust debate.  While both models are 
valuable normative ideals, the watchdog model “looks quite unlike the symbiotic 
relationship of the institutional press and the institutions of government that is well 
established by empirical research” (Lawrence, ¶10).  According to Lawrence, neither the 
marketplace model nor the watchdog model of press behavior account for how news 
filters the public’s diversity of perspectives.  
 The term, “adversarial,” has mixed reviews in available literature.  George 
Stephanopoulos, former senior policy adviser to President Bill Clinton said, “The 
working, day-to-day political press is neither liberal nor conservative.  They are 
adversarial” (Gardels, 1995, p. 23).  Stephanopoulos indicated it is a noble American 
tradition for the press to show its autonomy by questioning the motives and actions of 
government officials.  The intentions behind the tradition, however, may be more self-
serving than protecting the public for democracy’s sake.   
 The media tend to cover conflict “as if it were a national past time.  Disputes are 
aired not only on their merits, but also for entertainment value.  Conflict is viewed as 
much more interesting than agreement” (Marks & Marks, 1999, p. 11).  “Today it is fair 
to question whether the adversarial stance has gone too far in its obsession with conflict, 
controversy, and scandal” (Gardels, p. 23).   Stephanopoulos said the adversarial press 
corps in Washington has a tendency, as a pack, to assume that all political actors act on 
political motives.  This skeptical view of the government translates to the public.  “The 
danger for society at large is that it becomes impossible to rally the nation around any 
great public purpose—except war” (Gardels, p. 24).  The press’s absence of detachment 
and distance from mainstream news “has indeed transformed American journalism in 
ways that it, and the democracy it serves, can ill afford.  Without detachment, 
identification with the nation’s leaders becomes the order of the day” (Insana, 2003, p. 7).  
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While detachment from government is desirable, “attempts to disconnect journalism and 
citizenship must be regarded with suspicion” (Insana, p.7).   
 
 
Endangering Individual Freedoms 
 The Commission on Freedom of the Press (Leigh, 1947), known collegially as the 
Hutchins Commission, defined press freedom as freedom from coercion and freedom for 
the expression of opinion.  Press responsibilities evolve, changing the expectations and 
functions of the press, and the press will always answer to someone or something to 
maintain its livelihood.  According to the Hutchins Commission, the loss of press 
freedoms is a great loss for America.  A free-as-possible press is imperative to protecting 
free speech, public debate, and democratic freedoms for all members of society.  In the 
1940s, the Commission announced press freedoms were in danger. Mass media limited 
individuals’ opportunities to express personal opinions through the press, and unethical 
press tactics warranted government restrictions (Leigh, 1947).   
 History has proven “any concept of press freedom must be grounded in the 
thought of its age” (Coleman, 1997, p. 61).  As American society has technologically 
developed and changed its views on economic and political trends and moral 
philosophies, journalism has responded and grown with the culture.  With masses of 
people screaming to be heard, the media represent only major points of view posed by the 
loudest and most powerful groups.  Societal groups are becoming informed citizens of 
their own will and using the media as go-betweens instead of relying on them as 
watchdogs, as evident in the cascading activation model (Entman, 2003).   
 Press freedoms are diminishing because elite views dominate the news agenda, 
limiting balanced viewpoints, which the public needs to form its opinions and engage in 
the debate needed to search for truth, find common ground, and maintain a democratic 
state.  September 11 provided the media an opportunity to open debate and lead 
discussion about the United States’ past support to brutal dictatorship in other countries, 
but the national press preferred to ignore topics opposing the patriotic wave (Konner, 
2002; Entman, 2003).  The immense coverage of the terrorist attacks left President 
Bush’s pre-September 11 debatable policies largely unattended by the media.  Lack of 
news coverage on America’s numerous other crises may show “the news media, not less 
than politicians, have been swayed by the Bush Ultimatum ‘either you’re with us or for 
terrorism’” (Konner, 2002, ¶ 9).          
 
Findings Summary and Hypotheses        
 Many studies in this literature review allude to the press’s declining role as 
government adversary.  It is worth noting again that Clayman and Heritage’s (2002) 
study found increasing trends in adversarial relations over time.  Increased media 
adversarial relations with powerful political actors send a message to the public that the 
press is autonomous and “willing to hold even the most elite agents of power accountable 
before the public, even if it fosters uneasiness among the public about the proper 
boundaries of journalistic professionalism” (Clayman & Heritage, 2002, p. 772).  The 
withdrawal of deference, however, “may be one contributing factor to rising skepticism 
regarding the presidency, declining social status accorded to that office, and a reduction 
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in the social distance separating the president from ordinary citizens” (Clayman & 
Heritage, p. 772). 
 Because of the lack of knowledge surrounding the immediate events of September 
11, the press was more dependent on the president for news.  The crisis gave elite 
political sources like the president more room to control the news agenda because such 
sources had a monopoly on the information.  The rally effect literature suggests an 
elevated status of the president’s role during times of crisis.  Based on this information, it 
may be inferred that the press may have been more deferent to the president and the 
president’s agenda on and directly following September 11.  Though Clayman and 
Heritage’s (2002) study found an overall increase in adversarial relations between the 
press and the president from Eisenhower to Reagan’s administrations, a six-month time 
difference during Bush’s administration should not yield significant differences in 
adversarial relations from June 2001 to December 2001.  If there is an increase in 
deferential qualities of press briefing questions directly following September 11, the 
change is not anticipated to be permanent.         
 This thesis examines whether the White House press corps was more deferential 
or adversarial to then Press Secretary Ari Fleischer during press briefings after the 
terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and thus more adversarial or deferential to the 
president’s agenda.  Based on the studies, books, and articles in this review, a literature 
base has been formed to provide a base of information for its purpose.  The literature base 
guides the study to test and address the following hypotheses:    
    
H0:  Press briefing questions from pre-September 11 and post-September 11 press 
briefings will contain no significant differences over time.   
 
H1:  Press briefing questions in the direct aftermath of September 11, 2001 (the latter 
press briefings of September) will contain more deferential press questions than questions 
asked before September 11.          
 
H2:  September 11 questions will be most deferential.      
 
H3:  Adversarial questions will increase from September 11 to the direct aftermath, and 
again from the direct aftermath to the December 2001 press briefings comprising the 
post-September 11 question phase.           
 
H4:  The number of questions related to foreign policy issues and questions referencing 
Congress or other powerful political elites will be proportional to the number of foreign 
policy and Congress questions demonstrating adversarial relations in press briefings. 
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CHAPTER 3.  METHOD 
 
 
Content Analysis        
 Clayman and Heritage (2002) developed a specific content analysis method to 
measure adversarial levels of questions journalists ask public figures during interviews 
and press conferences.   The method of this thesis follows the content analysis coding 
method they created.  Clayman and Heritage’s innovative method of analyzing media 
questions builds on previous questioning research, but it is one of the first studies to 
quantify journalistic conduct during press conferences by focusing less on question 
content and more on formal question design features  (Clayman & Heritage, p. 752-753).  
Clayman and Heritage's coding system measures the media's adversarial relations with 
the president through questions reporters asked Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan during 
press conferences.  Clayman and Heritage analyzed four conferences per year for the four 
years of each president’s first term in office.  They compared their findings from each 
president’s press conferences over a three-decade span to measure the differences in 
adversarial and deferential questions asked by journalists.       
 This thesis deviates from Clayman and Heritage’s study by measuring press 
behavior during six months of a single president’s term based on interaction with the 
president’s press secretary.  The Clayman and Heritage analyzing system is applied to 
questions asked by the media during press briefings held by White House Press Secretary 
Ari Fleischer before, on, and after the September 11 terrorist attacks to determine if the 
media behaved more or less adversarial toward Fleischer and President Bush's agenda 
after September 11 than before the attacks.  The Clayman and Heritage analyzing system 
identifies four basic dimensions of adversarial relations—initiative, directness, 
assertiveness, and hostility—indicated by 10 distinct features of question design.  Each 
adversarial question dimension has either two or three indicators, totaling 10.  The press 
questions and prefatory statements are coded for each briefing according to the 10 
distinct features of question design (see Appendix A and Appendix B).  
 Initiative is media aggression indicated by three question design features: question 
complexity, question cascades, and follow-up questions.  Question complexity is 
characterized by elaborateness of the journalist's questioning turn, which is defined by 
simple questions, prefatory statements, multiple questions, and supercomplex statements.   
Simply, question complexity is measured in “units of talk,” (Clayman & Heritage, 2002, 
p. 754) which are the number of questions asked by a reporter in a single turn, and by 
prefatory statements reporters make before asking their question or questions.   
 Simple questions usually are one sentence and are the least elaborate type of 
question, lacking complexity.  Prefatory statements provide background information and 
“can also be used to introduce information that is hostile to the president and to exert 
pressure for a response” (Clayman & Heritage, 2002, p. 755).  They also may make it 
“more difficult for the president to sidestep the question or offer, say, a simplistically 
rosy...response.”  Preface statements increase question complexity, exercising initiative.  
(Degrees to which a prefatory statement is hostile are examined in the adversarial quality 
of assertiveness).  Multiple questions multiply demands on the interviewee, and 
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supercomlex questions combine multiple questions and prefaced statements to show 
initiative by increasing the complexity of the questioning turn. 
 Question cascades are a series of questions asking different versions of the same 
issue, “unlike the multipart questions...which raise separate and distinct issues for the 
president to address” (Clayman & Heritage, 2002, p. 757).   Cascades demonstrate 
initiative because the latter question or questions in the series “tightens or narrows the 
parameters of an acceptable response” (Clayman & Heritage, p. 757).  Follow-up 
questions, the third initiative indicator, are additional questions asked because the 
reporter did not find the initial response offered to be adequate.   The reporter fights for 
an extra turn, but because this turn is contingent on the speaker recognizing and calling 
on the same reporter, follow-up questions are an imperfect indicator of initiative.   
 Compared to Clayman and Heritage’s (2002) study, this thesis’s frequency of 
follow-up questions is more conservative in indicating and coding initiative.  Fleischer 
typically allows reporters in his press briefings two questions each, compared to press 
conferences, where reporters “are typically restricted to just a single turn at talk” 
(Clayman & Heritage, p. 757).  Therefore, in some cases press briefing follow-up 
questions do not signify as much initiative as do press conference follow-up questions.  
In addition, this study codes questions from transcribed briefings.  Because the briefings 
identify a new question but do not state who is asking the question, it is not always clear 
whether a particular question is a follow-up.  Often, however, Fleischer recognizes a 
reporter by name, a reporter states she or he is following-up on the previous question, or 
the wording of a follow-up question makes apparent that is a follow-up to the previous 
question.   
 The second adversarial dimension, directness, is media bluntness and 
straightforwardness indicated by two question design features: other-referencing 
questioning frames and self-referencing questioning frames. Because these frames 
display indirectness, mitigating the question’s forcefulness, directness is measured by 
questions that do not contain these frames.  Other-referencing questioning frames give 
the president a choice in answering a question by engaging his ability or willingness, 
characterized by phrases like "would/will you" or "could/can you" followed by an action 
verb like "comment," "explain," or "tell."  “Although other-referencing frames generally 
are deferential, they are not all equally so—willingness frames are more deferential than 
ability frames” (Clayman & Heritage, 2002, p. 760).  Both frames, however, give the 
interviewee an “out.”  Self-referencing question frames refer to the journalist's intentions 
or motivations in asking a question, and they are characterized by phrases like "I wonder/ 
wondered/ was wondering," "I want/would like to ask," or "can/ could/ may I ask."  The 
“can/could/may I ask” questions are the most indirect and deferential because they ask 
for permission to ask a question. 
 Assertiveness, the third dimension, is media push for a particular response 
indicated by two question design features: preface tilts and negatively formulated 
questions.  Preface tilts are prefatory statements involving either a hostile tilt or 
innocuous tilt on a question designed to evoke a yes/no response from the interviewee.  
Some prefaced statements are neutral and do not have a tilt toward a yes/no response.  
Hostile tilts are most adversarial and assertive, while innocuous tilts are not adversarial 
and actually can be favorable to the interviewee.  Negatively formulated questions are 
highly assertive, including negativity in the actual question, not in the prefatory 
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statement, and evoking an unfavorable yes/no answer by the interviewee.  Negatively 
formulated questions typically begin with phrases like "isn't it," "aren't you," or "don't 
you think that."  “The tilt is so strong that speakers (reporters) are often treated as if they 
were making an assertion rather than merely asking a question” (Clayman & Heritage, 
2002, p. 765). 
 Hostility, the fourth and last adversarial dimension of question design, is media 
overt criticism of the interviewee indicated by three question design features: preface 
hostility, global hostility, and accountability questions. These features “reveal a 
substantially greater propensity for journalists to convey a critical attitude toward the 
president and his administration” (Clayman & Heritage, 2002, p. 771).  Preface hostility 
is evident in a prefatory statement directly and explicitly critical of the interviewee’s 
policies, words, deeds, or previous statements.  The hostile preface may be the focus of 
the question, for example, by containing critical statements in the preface and asking the 
interviewee to comment on the prefaced statements.  The hostile preface also may 
presuppose the question.  In this case, the question builds on the prefatory criticism but 
does not ask the speaker to comment on it.  Presupposed prefaces are more hostile 
because “the prefatory criticism is treated as a given, becoming part of the 
presuppositional foundations of the question in such a way as to be less accessible to 
refutation” (Clayman & Heritage, p. 767).  When the preface is the focus, the speaker has 
an opportunity to oppose it. 
 Global hostility is a combination of preface hostility and questions directly and 
explicitly critical of the interviewee’s words, deeds, or previous statements.  Follow-up 
questions without prefatory statements also may be globally hostile when they challenge 
the interviewee’s remarks.  Accountability questions, the third indicator of hostility, ask 
the speaker to provide a rationale for a given action or decision.  According to Clayman 
and Heritage, the coding of hostility in adversarial questions requires the most judgment 
and interpretation compared to initiative, directness, and assertiveness because the 
“substantive content of the talk enters into the analysis” (2002, p. 776).  “Accountability 
questions cast the president’s conduct as at least potentially improper, while placing him 
in the position of having to defend himself” (Clayman & Heritage, p. 769).  
Accountability questions begin with the phrases “why did you?” and “how could you?”  
The “why” questions are more neutral, while the “how” questions are the more hostile 
variant.  
 In addition to coding questions according to the 10 question design features, 
press questions are categorized into foreign or domestic issues.  Questions referencing 
differences between Congress and President Bush also are noted.  Making a distinction 
between adversarial relations in foreign and domestic issues and in questions through 
which Congress objects to the president’s actions may offer alternative reasons for some 
questions being more adversarial than other questions.  If there is an increase in deference 
on and directly following September 11, it may be the result of factors other than the 
terrorist attacks.  Considering outside constraints of press questions provides alternative 
reasons to prove why September 11 made an impact on adversarial relations between the 
press and the White House.      
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Subjects and Materials 
  This content analysis codes press questions from written transcripts of 37 Ari 
Fleischer press briefings, including eight press briefings from June 2001, 16 press 
briefings from September 2001, and 13 press briefings from December 2001.   These 
briefings provide a sample of press questions asked in ordinary time, during a national 
crisis and its direct aftermath, and three months after a national crisis.  Analyzing these 
three months of press questions indicates trends in increasing or decreasing adversarial 
relations between the media and press secretary.  This study investigates whether the 
public mood after September 11 was such that reporters found it necessary to be more 
deferential and to demonstrate more patriotism than they do during normal time.  As time 
elapsed, it could be anticipated that reporters return to their previous norms of press-
source relations.  This method is feasible and convenient for this project because the 
needed materials are readily available online at www.whitehouse.gov.  The White 
House’s website organizes press briefings by date, fully transcribed, and easy to 
download and print. 
 
 
Time and Coder Reliability 
 With 370 pages of transcribed briefings and 10 variables to look for in each 
question, the question coding process is lengthy.  Two weeks were needed to code the 37 
press briefings by breaking the briefings into groups of two of three per day.  Each 
briefing averages 10 pages and took at least two-three hours to code.  Tallying, 
computing, charting, and converting into percents all of the coded data also take a 
considerable amount of time.   
 Clayman and Heritage’s (2002) study establishes clear guidelines to enforce 
coder reliability, and this study strictly follows these guidelines to analyze data and 
produce valid information from the 2001 Ari Fleischer press briefings.  A second coder 
ensures the primary coder’s accuracy by analyzing randomly selected sequential pages of 
briefing questions.  Of 98 question turns and features analyzed by both coders, 88 of 
these matched, with a coder reliability of 89.8 percent.  To ensure reliability further, the 
primary coder reevaluated the first eight briefings coded to lessen the possibility that 
unfamiliarity with the methodology skewed the early briefing results. 
 
 
Definition of Variables 
 Clayman and Heritage’s (2002) study defined the following variables: 
Accountability question—Indicator of media hostility; asks the interviewee to provide a 
rationale for a given action or decision. 
 
Adversarial questioning—When members of the media show more initiative, directness, 
assertiveness, and hostility to powerful political sources through press conference 
questions. 
 
Assertiveness—Dimension of adversarial relations; Media push for a particular response 
indicated by preface tilts and negatively formulated questions. 
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Deference—Members of the media showing less initiative, directness, assertiveness, and 
hostility and more respect and esteem to the president and powerful political sources 
through press conference questions. 
 
Directness—Dimension of adversarial relations; media bluntness and straightforwardness 
indicated by other-referencing questioning frames and self-referencing questioning 
frames. 
 
Follow-up question—Indicator of media initiative; used when journalists fail to accept a 
source's response as adequate, causing the reporter ask for more information to embellish 
on the initial question's response. 
 
Global hostility—Indicator of media hostility; directly and explicitly critical remarks in 
both the journalist's prefatory statements and questions of the president's administration 
policies, words, deeds, or previous statements.  Simple questions are globally hostile 
when they consist of follow-up questions challenging the president's remarks. 
 
Hostile tilt—Preface tilt in a prefatory statement designed to be particularly damaging to  
the president. 
 
Hostility—Dimension of adversarial relations requiring the most interpretation on the 
part of the coder; media overt criticism of source indicated by preface hostility, global 
hostility, and accountability questions. 
 
Initiative—Dimension of adversarial relations; media aggression indicated by question 
complexity, question cascades, and follow-up questions. 
 
Innocuous tilt—Preface tilt in a prefatory statement not designed to be damaging to the 
president and potentially favorably to the president. 
 
Multiple question—Multipart question that multiplies demands on the interviewee. 
 
Negatively formulated question—Indicator of media assertiveness; negativity in the 
actual question evoking an unfavorable yes/no answer by the president.  Negatively 
formulated questions often begin with phrases like "isn't it," "aren't you," or "don't you 
think that." 
 
Other-referencing questioning frame—Indicator of media directness referencing the 
president's ability or willingness to answer a press question often beginning with phrases 
like "would/will you" or "could/can you" followed by an action verb like "comment," 
"explain," or "tell." 
 
Preface hostility—Indicator of media hostility; a directly and explicitly critical prefatory 
statements of the president's administration policies, words, deeds, or previous 
statements. 
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Preface tilt—Indicator of media assertiveness; prefatory statement involving a hostile tilt 
or innocuous tilt on a question designed to evoke a yes/no response from the president. 
 
Prefatory statement—Elaborated preliminary statement preceding a question. 
Question complexity—Indicator of media initiative; the elaborateness of the journalist's 
question turn characterized by simple questions, prefatory statements, multiple questions, 
and supercomplex statements. 
 
Question cascade—Indicator of media initiative involving journalists asking the president 
different versions of the same question after receiving an initial answer. 
 
Self-referencing question frame—Indicator of media directness referencing journalist's 
Intentions/motivations in asking a question containing the phases "I wonder/ wondered/ 
was wondering," "I want/would like to ask," or "can/could/may I ask." 
 
Simple question—One-sentence question. 
 
Supercomplex statement—Combines prefatory statements with multiple questions. 
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CHAPTER 4.  RESULTS 
 
 
 
Organization of Results 
 To examine the adversarial relations between the White House Press Corps and 
Ari Fleischer three months before, on, directly following, and three months after 
September 11, the data are organized by time period relative to September 11.  Press 
briefing questions from June 2001, September 2001, and December 2001 constitute the 
data for this study, but because the first three briefings of September occur before 
September 11, these three briefings are included in the “pre 9/11” data along with the 
eight June briefings.  The “9/11” data include the two briefings from September 11, and 
the “9/11 aftermath” data include the 11 remaining September briefings.  “Post 9/11” data 
represent press briefing data from December.  Because the crisis of September of 11 is 
hypothesized to change press-source relations, organizing the press question data by 
chronological order in relation to September 11 and not simply by chronological month 
makes the content analysis data more significant to the study’s purpose.   
 Organizing the data relative to September 11 instead of strictly by month also 
almost equally divides the questioning turns into thirds, with the exemption of the day of 
September 11.  This makes the press briefing phases easier to compare (as demonstrated 
in Table 1, Table 2, and Graph 1).  The press secretary answering or commenting on a 
reporter’s question or series of questions and/or statements distinguishes a questioning 
turn.  Once Fleischer responds to a reporter’s inquiry, a new questioning turn begins with 
a new question or series of questions and/or statements by a reporter.   
 
Table 1   
Total Questioning Turns and Total Questions by Month 
 Questioning Turns % Questions %
June  536 25.32 642 23.31
Sept  876 41.38 1,147 41.65
Dec 705 33.30 965 35.04
Total 2,117 100 2,754 100
 
Table 2   
Total Questioning Turns and Total Questions Relative to September 11 
 Questioning Turns % Questions %
Pre-9/11 691  32.6 832  30.2
9/11  31    1.5 40    1.5
9/11 Direct Aftermath 690  32.6 917  33.3
Post-9/11 705  33.3 965   35
Total 2,117 100 2,754 100
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Figure 1                  
Questioning Turn Percentages: Chronological Month v. Time Period Relative to 
September 
 
The four phases of press briefing data are categorized by each of the four basic 
dimensions of adversarial relations, initiative, directness, assertiveness, and hostility, to 
examine the effects of each of the 10 question design features that indicate adversarial 
relations.  Within each of the 10 question design features, data pertaining to foreign 
policy press questions and questions referencing a Congressional member with a 
statement averse to the president’s agenda are recorded.  Numbers and percentages of 
foreign policy questions are represented in tables by the letter “F,” and questions 
referencing Congress are represented by the letter “C.”  Each question is either a foreign 
policy or domestic affairs question.  The number of domestic affairs questions is the 
difference between the total and the number of foreign policy questions.  Percentages of 
domestic affairs questions are the difference between 100 and the percentages of foreign 
policy questions.  A question referencing Congress may be either a domestic policy 
question or a foreign policy question. 
 Data for each of the 10 question design features are listed in three separate tables: 
one table of total numbers, a second table of converted percentages of those total 
numbers, and a third table (appearing in a separate section from the first two) detailing 
foreign policy questions and questions referencing Congress.  Because each table 
contains multiple data, some columns are bold type to distinguish them as the table’s 
primary focus.  Data to the right of a bold column are components of that bold column.   
Bold-column data are components of the total and together equal the total, which appears 
in bold font at the right-hand side of each table.  For example, “F” and “C” data referring 
to a design feature will appear to the right of the bold-columned feature they represent.   
 Not all data in the tables are based on the same total number of questions.  
Following Clayman and Heritage’s (2002) study, question design features are measured 
out of either the total number of questioning turns, total questions, total yes-no questions, 
or total prefaced statements.   Each table is labeled accordingly.  Percentage tables are 
percents out of a standard 100-point scale, and they share the same data as their 
corresponding total number table.  For example, Table 5 lists the number of question 
cascades of the total number of questions asked during this study’s sample.  
Corresponding Table 6 lists the percentages of Table 5’s statistics, with each percentage 
representing the number of cascades divided by the total number of questions.  Since 
columns in black type are components of the bold-type columns and not the total number, 
black-type columns use their corresponding bold column for a total number and are 
divided by this number to produce an accurate percentage.   
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Initiative 
 The following statements are helpful in interpreting the results: 
• Simple questions (605) + prefaced questions (472) + multiple questions (258) + 
supercomplex questions (204) + follow-up questions (578) = total questioning 
turns (2,117). 
• Using the question design features to interpret the above, question complexity 
design feature questions (1, 539) + follow-up questions (578) = total questioning 
turns (2,117). 
• Each questioning turn may contain any combination of the remaining eight 
question design features.  For example, a question cascade will be counted as a 
cascade within a multiple question or a series of follow-up questions.  A cascade 
is not able to define a questioning turn as are the above five question types. 
• Within each questioning turn, there may be more than one question.  Individually 
counting every question produces the total number of questions: 2,754.  
 
Table 3   
Total Number of Question Complexity Features 
 Simple Prefaced Multiple Supercomplex* Total Complex Questions
Pre-9/11 256 156 69 50 531
9/11  20 2 7 0 29
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
172 193 93 76 534
Post-9/11 157 121 89 78 445
Total 605 472 258 204 1,539
*Supercomplex Questions: Chi Square = 52.136, df=33, p<.05. 
 
  Table 4   
  Total Percentages of Question Complexity Features  
 Simple% Prefaced% Multiple% Supercomplex% 
Pre-9/11 48.2 29.4 13 9.4 
9/11 67 6.9 24.1 0 
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
32.2 36.1 17.4
 
14.2 
Post-9/11 35.3 27.2 20 17.5 
Total 39.3 30.7 16.8 13.3 
 
   Simple questions, which lack initiative and are most deferential, account for 
almost 40 percent of this design feature total.  Simple questions increase almost 19 
percent on 9/11 to 67 percent, then decrease by more than half in the aftermath, becoming 
more adversarial.  They increase slightly post-9/11, remaining basically the same but 
showing a gradual increase in adversarial relations.  Pre-9/11 and post-9/11 simple 
questions differ by more than 10 percent, with post-9/11 questions being more 
adversarial.  Simple questions are most predominate in every September 11 stage except 
the aftermath, where prefaced questions are the most frequent.   
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 Prefaced questions decrease 22.5 percent on 9/11, but they are almost 7 percent 
greater in the aftermath than pre-9/11.  There also are more prefaced questions in the 
aftermath than post-9/11.  Multiple questions are the only type of questioning turn to 
increase on 9/11, showing an increase of adversarial relations on this day.  They are also 
the only type to decrease in the direct aftermath of 9/11.  Pre- and post-9/11 multiple 
questions are within a 10 percent range.  Supercomplex questions are the most adversarial 
and least frequent type of questioning turn, and there are no supercomplex questions on 
9/11.  There is less than a 10 percent gap between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 questions.  Of 
all the question complexity features, supercomplex questions are the only ones that are 
statistically significant   
 
Table 5   
Total Number of Question Cascades 
 No Cascade Cascade Total Questions
Pre-9/11 806 26 832
9/11 38 2 40
9/11 Aftermath 877 40 917
Post-9/11 917 48 965
Total 2,638 116 2,754
 
Table 6 
Total Percentages of Question Cascades  
 No Cascade% Cascade%
Pre-9/11 96.9 3.1
9/11  95 5
9/11 Aftermath 95.6 4.4
Post-9/11 95 5
Total 95.8 4.2
  
 Question cascades for all four phases are within 2 percent of each other.  
Cascades decrease two percent from pre-9-11 to 9-11, and then remain almost equal from 
9/11-post-9/11.   
 
Table 7   
Total Number of Follow-Up Questions  
 Not Follow-Up Follow-Up Total Questioning Turns 
Pre-9/11 529 160 691 
9/11 29 2 31 
9/11 Aftermath 534 156 690 
Post-9/11 445 260 705 
Total 1,537 578 2,117 
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Table 8   
Total Percentages of Follow-Up Questions  
 Not Follow-Up% Follow-Up%
Pre-9/11 76.8 23.2
9/11 93.5 6.5
9/11 Aftermath 77.4 22.6
Post-9/11 63.1 36.9
Total 72.7 27.3
 
 Follow-up questions decrease from pre-9/11 to 9/11 and then gradually increase. 
The percents of pre-9/11 and post-9/11 questions, however, are not similar, differing by 
13.5 percent with post-9/11 questions containing more of the adversarial follow-up 
questions.   
 
 
Directness 
 
Table 9   
Total Number of Other-Referencing Question Frames  
 None OR Frames Ability Willingness Total Questions 
Pre-9/11 790 42 30 12 832 
9/11 38 2 1 1 40 
9/11 Aftermath 852 65 59 6 917 
Post-9/11 895 70 67 3 965 
Total 2,575 179 157 22 2,754 
 
Table 10 
Total Percentages of Other-Referencing Question Frames  
 None% OR Frames% Ability% Willingness% 
Pre-9/11 95.1 5 71.4 28.6 
9/11 95 5 50 50 
9/11  Aftermath 92.9 7.1 90.8 9.2 
Post-9/11 92.7 7.3 95.7 4.3 
Total 93.5 6.5 87.7 12.3 
  
 Other-referencing frames are more prevalent after September 11 than on or before 
it, signifying an increase in deference after the attacks.  Pre-9/11 and 9/11 questions tie in 
their high deference levels of 95 percent and then slightly increase in adversarial relations 
in the aftermath phase.  The number of pre-9/11 and post-9/11 questions is similar, 
differing by only 2.1 percent.  The majority of the other-referencing frames, 87.7 percent, 
reference Fleischer’s ability to answer a question, and there are more adversarial than 
willingness frames.  Other-referencing frames represent a small number of total press 
questions.  Overall, the other-referencing question frames make a low deferential 
contribution to the sample. 
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Table 11   
Total Number of Self-Referencing Question Frames  
 None SR Frames Wonder Like/Want Can/May Total Questions 
Pre-9/11 799 33 10 2 21 832 
9/11 40 0 0 0 0 40 
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
874 
 
43 13 2 28
 
917 
Post-9/11 920 45 8 6 31 965 
Total 2,633 121 31 10 80 2,754 
 
Table 12 
Total Percentages of Self-Referencing Question Frames  
 None% SR Frames% Wonder% Like/Want% Can/May% 
Pre-9/11 96 4 30.3 6.1 63.6 
9/11 100 0 0 0 0 
9/11 
Aftermath 95.3 4.7 30.2 4.7 65.2 
Post-9/11 95.3 4.7 17.8 13.3 68.9 
Total 95.6 4.4 25.6 8.3 65.2 
 
 Like other-referencing question frames, self-referencing question frames are 
deferential, so larger numbers of frames signify increased deference as opposed to 
increased adversarial relations.  Also like other-referencing question frames, self-
referencing question frames represent a small portion of the brief briefing questions.  
Less than 5 percent of all press briefing questions contain self-referencing frames.  All 
9/11 phases have roughly the same percent of self-referencing frames, with the exception 
of 9/11, which has none.   
 
 
Assertiveness 
 Tables under the heading of this adversarial indicator are measured out of a total 
number of yes-no questions.  The yes-no question total (1,727) is derived by individually 
marking each question of every press conference.  Some questions requiring a yes or no 
answer are non-prefaced, simple questions.  These are marked “no preface.”  The yes-no 
questions preceded by a prefatory statement are marked “no tilt” if the prefaces are 
neutral.  “Innocuous” and “hostile” prefaces are marked accordingly with their tilt in 
favor of or against the press secretary.  Negative questions are measured out of the total 
number of yes-no questions but do not comprise a portion of total.   
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Table 13 
  Total Number of Yes-No Questions with a Preface Tilt  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 14 
  Total Percentages of Yes-No Questions with a Preface Tilt  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Questions with a tilt toward a yes or no answer from Fleischer comprise 62.7 
percent of the total press questions asked during the sample briefings.  Almost 59 percent 
of these questions are not prefaced.  Yes-no questions with no prefatory statement 
increase on 9/11 by 32.6 percent to account for 89.7 percent of yes-no questions asked on 
9/11.  Prefaced yes-no questions with no tilt drop on 9/11 but show no major changes in 
the other three 9/11 phases. Questions with an innocuous tilt are uncommon and total less 
than 1 percent of all yes-no questions.  The greatest percentage of hostile tilts is in the 
pre-9/11 phase, and hostile tilts account for less than 12 percent of all tilted questions.  
More question tilts are hostile than innocuous, but neither accounts for a large part of yes-
no questions.  
 
Table 15 
Total Number of Negatively Formulated Yes-No Questions  
 Not Negative Negative Total Yes-No Questions 
Pre-9/11 431 32 463 
9/11  29 0 29 
9/11 Aftermath 600 34 634 
Post-9/11 584 21 605 
Total 1,640 87 1,727 
 
 
 
 
 No Preface No Tilt Innocuous Hostile Total Yes-No Questions 
Pre-9/11 262 118 7 72 459 
9/11 26 3 0 0 29 
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
341 213 6 74
 
634 
Post-9/11 384 172 1 48 605 
Total 1,013 506 14 194 1,727 
 No Preface% No Tilt% Innocuous%
 
Hostile% 
Pre-9/11 57.1 25.7 1.5 15.7 
9/11 89.7 10.3 0 0 
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
53.8 33.6 1
 
11.7 
Post-9/11 63.5 28.4 .2 7.9 
Total 58.7 29.3 .8 11.2 
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Table 16 
Total Percentages of Negatively Formulated Yes-No Questions  
 Not Negative% Negative% 
Pre-9/11 93.1 6.9 
9/11  100 0 
9/11 Aftermath 94.6 5.4 
Post-9/11 96.5 3.5 
Total 95 5 
 
 Five percent of all prefaced tilts requiring a yes-no answer are negatively 
formulated questions.  Few differences occur across the 9/11 phases.  The most 
significant change is a 6.9 percent drop in negatively formulated questions on 9/11, 
which had no negative press questions.   
 
 
Hostility 
 Tables 17 and 18 of hostility chart questions and percentages out of a total 
number of prefaced questions.  Adding prefaced questions (472) and supercomplex 
questions (204) from Table 3 with prefaced follow-up questions (128) produces the 
number of total prefaced questions (804) in Table 17.  Follow-up questions are coded as 
either prefaced or non-prefaced to get an accurate number of total questioning turns and 
an accurate figure of total prefaced questions.  Appendix C lists the daily press briefing 
totals of prefaced questions, questioning turns, and press briefing questions. 
 
Table 17 
Total Number of Preface Hostility Questions 
 Nonhostile Preface 
Hostile 
Preface
Preface 
Focus
Preface
Presupposed 
Total Prefaced 
Questions 
Pre-9/11 232 21 12 9 253 
9/11 2 0 0 0 2 
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
274 38 20 18
 
312 
Post-9/11 200 37 19 18 237 
Total 708 96 51 45 804 
 
Table 18   
Total Percentages of Preface Hostility Questions  
 Nonhostile Preface% 
Hostile 
Preface%
Preface 
Focus%
Preface 
Presupposed % 
Pre-9/11 91.7 8.3 57.1 42.9 
9/11  100 0 0 0 
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
87.8 12.2 52.6
 
47.4 
Post-9/11 84.4 15.6 51.4 48.7 
Total 88.1 11.9 53.1 46.9 
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Less than 12 percent of prefaced questions contain a hostile preface.  The more-
hostile preface presupposed questions pre-9/11 account for 42.9 percent of preface 
hostility, 14.2 percent less than less-hostile preface focus questions.  There are no hostile 
preface questions on 9/11, and the difference between the two question types narrows to a 
near split in the 9/11 aftermath and post-9/11, with preface focus questions remaining 
slightly higher.   
 
Table 19  
Total Number of Global Hostility Questions 
 Nonhostile Hostile Total Questioning Turns 
Pre-9/11 662 29 691 
9/11 31 0 31 
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
636 54
 
690 
Post-9/11 655 50 705 
Total 1,984 133 2,117 
 
Table 20   
Total Percentages of Global Hostility Questions  
 Nonhostile% Hostile%
Pre-9/11 95.8 4.2
9/11  100 0
9/11 Aftermath 92.2 7.8
Post-9/11 92.9 7.1
Total 93.7 6.3
 
 Press questions are most globally hostile in the 9/11 aftermath, although there is 
not much variation among the 9/11 phases.   
 
Table 21  
Total Number of Accountability Questions 
 None Acct F C Ability Willing Total Questions
Pre-9/11 814 18 10 2 16 2 832
9/11  40 0 0 0 0 0 40
9/11 Aftermath 904 13 1 1 11 2 917
Post-9/11 955 10 1 4 9 1 965
Total 2,713 41 12 7 36 5 2,754
 
Table 22   
Total Percentages of Accountability Questions  
 None% Accountability% F% C% Ability%  Willing% 
Pre-9/11 97.8 2.2 55.6 11.1 88.9 1 
9/11  100 0 0 0 0 0 
9/11 Aftermath 98.6 1.4 7.7 7.7 84.6 15.4 
Post-9/11 99 1 10 40 90 10 
Total 98.5 1.5 29.3 17.1 87.8 12.2 
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Questions referring to why President Bush did something (willingness) comprise 
12.2 percent of accountability questions, 75.6 percent less than questions questioning 
how the president could have done something (ability).  
 
 
Foreign Policy and Congress Questions 
  
Table 23 
Foreign Policy and Congress Question Complexity Features  
 Simple F F% C C% Pref F F% C C%
Pre-9/11 256 59 23 21 8.2 156 45 28.8 30 19.2
9/11  20 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
172 
 
28 16.3 3 1.7 193 39
 
20.2 
 
15 7.7
Post-9/11 157 46 29.3 22 14 121 59 48.8 34 28.1
Total 605 133 22 46 7.6 472 143 30.3 79 16.7
  
 Mult F F% C C% Super F F% C C%
Pre-9/11 69 20 29 11 15.9 50 15 30 10 20
9/11  7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
93 
 
17 18.3 4 4.3 76 21
 
27.6 
 
7 9.2
Post-9/11 89 43 48.3 10 11.2 78 43 56.6 13 16.7
Total 258 80 31 25 9.7 204 79 38.7 30 14.7
 
 Total Complex Questions F F% C C% 
Pre-9/11 531 139 21.2 65 13.6 
9/11  29 0 0 0 0 
9/11 
Aftermath 534 105 19.7 29
 
5.43 
Post-9/11 445 191 42.9 78 17.1 
Total 1,539 435 28.3 172 11.5 
  
Table 24 
Foreign Policy and Congress Question Cascades  
 Cascade F F% C C% Total Questions 
Pre-9/11 26 7 27 2 7.7 832 
9/11 2 0 0 0 0 40 
9/11 
Aftermath 40 7 17.5 1 2.5 917 
Post-9/11 48 25 52.1 7 14.6 965 
Total 116 39 33.6 10 8.6 2,754 
Chi Square significant for C, post-9/11 phase only 
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Table 25 
Foreign Policy and Congress Follow-Up Questions  
 Follow-Up F F% C C% Total Questioning Turns 
Pre-9/11 160 31 19.4 15 9.4 691 
9/11 2 0 0 0 0 31 
9/11 Aftermath 156 19 12.2 3 1.9 690 
Post-9/11 260 112 43.1 46 17.7 705 
Total 578 162 28.2 64 11.1 2,117 
  
Table 26   
Foreign Policy and Congress Other-Referencing Question Frames  
 OR Frames F F% C C% Total Questions 
Pre-9/11 42 11 26.2 2 4.8 832 
9/11 2 0 0 0 0 40 
9/11 Aftermath 65 8 12.3 4 6.2 917 
Post-9/11 70 27 38.6 12 17.1 965 
Total 179 46 25.7 18 10 2,754 
 
Table 27 
Foreign Policy and Congress Self-Referencing Question Frames  
 SR Frames F C F% C% Total Questions
Pre-9/11 33 10 3 30.0 9.1 832
9/11 0 0 0 0 0 40
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
43 
 
7 2 16.3 4.7 917
Post-9/11 45 21 6 46.7 13.3 965
Total 121 61 11 50.4 9.1 2,754
 
Table 28 
Foreign Policy and Congress Yes-No Questions with a Preface Tilt 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preface 
Tilt F F% C C%
Total Yes-No 
Questions 
Pre-9/11 197 60 30.5 36 18.3 459 
9/11 3 0 0 0 0 29 
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
293 
 
63 21.5 30 10.2
 
634 
Post-9/11 221 121 54.6 46 20.8 605 
Total 714 244 34.2 112 15.7 1,727 
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Table 29 
Foreign Policy and Congress Negatively Formulated Yes-No Questions  
 Negative F F% C C% Total Yes-No Questions 
Pre-9/11 32 4 12.5 4 12.5 463 
9/11  0 0 0 0 0 29 
9/11 Aftermath 34 10 29.4 1 2.9 634 
Post-9/11 21 7 33.3 6 28.6 605 
Total 87 21 24.1 11 12.6 1,727 
 
Table 30 
Foreign Policy and Congress Preface Hostility Questions 
 Hostile Preface F F% C C% Total Prefaced Questions
Pre-9/11 21 6 28.6 9 42.9 253
9/11 0 0 0 0 0 2
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
38 6 15.8 5 13.2 312
Post-9/11 37 19 51.4 16 43.2 237
Total 96 31 32.3 30 31.3 804
 
Table 31 
Foreign Policy and Congress Global Hostility Questions 
 Hostile F F% C C% Total Questioning Turns 
Pre-9/11 29 7 24.1 7 24.1 691 
9/11 0 0 0 0 0 31 
9/11 
Aftermath 
 
54 
 
5 9.3 1 1.9
 
690 
Post-9/11 50 30 60 8 16 705 
Total 133 42 31.6 16 12 2,117 
 
Table 32 
Foreign Policy and Congress Accountability Questions 
 Accountability F F% C C% Total Questions 
Pre-9/11 18 10 55.6 2 11.1 832 
9/11  0 0 0 0 0 40 
9/11 Aftermath 13 1 7.7 1 7.7 917 
Post-9/11 10 1 10 4 40 965 
Total 41 12 29.3 7 17.1 2,754 
Chi Square Significant for F and C, all three phases (excluding 9/11).  
 
 
Summary of Results 
 Tables 3-22 display press question data from specific question design features in 
relation to September 11 question phases, but they do not connect data across the sample.  
Because of the immense amount of data in this study, answers to the study’s hypotheses 
are included in the Results chapter and are used to highlight and compare the data from 
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all of the 10 question design features across the four phases of September 11 press 
questions.  Because the hypotheses make predictions about adversarial and deferential 
trends, they provide a foundation for spotting trends in the overall results.  Tables 23-32 
display foreign policy and Congress questions and percentages results for the 10 question 
design features.   
 Table 33 displays Hypotheses Null, One, Two, Three, and Four in a true/false 
pattern—true represented with a “T” and false represented with an “F”—results from 
each question design feature’s data are visually represented.  True and false answers are 
based on changes during the September 11 time phases in each question design feature’s 
percentage table, starting with Table 4 and continuing with even-numbered tables through 
Table 22.  The hypotheses in true/false statement form comprise Table 33’s legend for a 
brief and easy reference to the formal hypotheses on pages 16.   
 Overall, the data prove two of the five hypotheses correct.  Contrary to 
speculation, reporters ask 20 percent more adversarial questions in the September 11 
aftermath phase than they ask before the terrorist attacks.  Questions asked on September 
11 prove to be the most deferential, with 80 percent of the press questions showing more 
deference on the day of the attacks than in the pre-September 11 phase.  Many questions 
increase in adversarial relations in the direct aftermath and decrease in adversarial 
relations in the post-September 11 phase.  Post-September 11 phase questions, however, 
are similar in deference and adversarial relations to pre-September phase questions, but 
they are more adversarial than the September 11 questions. 
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Table 33 
Trends in Question Design Feature Results 
 H0 H1 H2 H3 H4 
Question Complexity      
          Simple Questions F F T F Ø 
          Prefaced Questions T F T F Ø 
          Multiple Questions T F F F Ø 
          Supercomplex Questions T F T T Ø 
Question Cascades T F F F Ø 
Follow-up Questions F T T T Ø 
Other-Referencing Questions T T F F Ø 
Self-Referencing Questions T T T F Ø 
Preface Tilt       
          No Tilt T F T F Ø 
          Innocuous Tilt T F T T Ø 
          Hostile Tilt T T T F Ø 
Negatively Formulated  Q T T T F Ø 
Preface Hostility T F T T Ø 
Global Hostility T F T F Ø 
Accountability Questions T T T F Ø 
      
Total True T 
Total False F 
 
13/ 86.7% 
2/ 13.3% 
6/ 40% 
9/ 60% 
12/ 80% 
3/ 20% 
4/ 26.7% 
11/ 73.3% 
Ø 
 
 
H0:  Press briefing questions from pre-September 11 and post-September 11 press briefings will contain no 
significant differences over time.   
H1:  Press briefing questions in the direct aftermath of September 11, 2001 (the latter press briefings of 
September) will contain more deferential press questions than questions asked before September 11.       
H2:  September 11 questions will be most deferential.     
H3:  Adversarial questions will increase from September 11 to the direct aftermath, and again from the 
direct aftermath to the December 2001 press briefings comprising the post-September 11 question phase.   
H4:  The number of questions related to foreign policy issues and questions referencing 
Congress or other powerful political elites will be proportional to the number of foreign 
policy and Congress questions demonstrating adversarial relations in press briefings. 
 37
 
CHAPTER 5.  DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
Thesis Overview 
 This study’s primary focus is to determine if the White House press corps acted 
more deferential to President Bush and his agenda after September 11, 2001, and if so, to 
see how long the period of decreased adversarial relations lasted.  This purpose is 
accomplished through a content analysis of 37 White House press briefings, conducted 
by then White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, examining press-briefing questions 
three months before, on, directly following, and three months after September 11 
according to four dimensions of adversarial relations: initiative, directness, assertiveness, 
and hostility. Ten question design features comprise the criteria to measure each 
dimension, and ultimately, to measure the degree to which the press acted more 
deferential or adversarial toward Fleischer after the September 11 attacks. 
 Overall, the study’s results show the White House press corps asked similar 
questions before and after September 11.  Though deferent questions soared to the 
sample’s highest levels on September 11, the press corps not only maintained its pre-
September deferential/adversarial relations with Fleischer in the weeks following 
September 11, but it became even more adversarial.  By December 2001, deference 
increased and adversarial relations decreased, but not by more than 10 percent of what 
they were before September 11.  This group of press members, in touch with the highest-
ranking political officials and newsmakers, initiated more direct, assertive, and hostile 
questions following the momentous domestic shakeup of September 11, 2001.   
 
Significant Findings 
 A Chi Square test for the 10 question design features in all four September 11 
time phases—pre-9/11, 9/11, 9/11 aftermath, and post-9/11--against time frame of 
analysis yielded no statistically significant results.  After dropping the two briefings on 
September 11 and re-running the Chi Square test against time frame of analysis for the 
remaining more numerically equivalent phases, supercomplex questions, a sub-feature of 
complex questions, was the only element to achieve statistical significance.  After 
removing the September 11 briefings from the equation, many features came close to a 
score of p<.05, but none of the 10 showed a significant relationship.  Further 
investigation in the form of a test for intergroup correlation revealed standardized item 
alpha of .84.  The .84 alpha suggests the similarity between the 10 design features is very 
high.  Even though no relationship was established based on time, all 10 constructs 
strongly are correlated with each other.  The intergroup correlation ended up being the 
bigger finding of this study.  The high alpha of the 10 features may account for low Chi 
Square significance.   
 
 
Explanation of Hypotheses 
 The Null Hypothesis, which states that pre- and post-September 11 press 
questions will be similar in adversarial content, is supported.  Excluding only two 
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indicators of initiative, most initiative questions and all questions indicating adversarial 
relations in directness, assertiveness, and hostility in the pre-September 11 and post-
September 11 phases are similar in adversarial content.  The adversarial and deferential 
question features in these two phases are similar within a 10 percent range.  This means 
that press questions asked between June and early September 2001 are no less or more 
adversarial than questions asked in December 2001, three months after September 11.  
Any changes in press behavior or alterations in the normal press-source relationship on 
and following September 11 are back to their pre-crises mode by the end of the year. 
 The analysis does not support Hypothesis One, which states press briefing 
questions in the weeks following September 11 will contain more deferential press 
questions than questions asked before September 11.  In the direct aftermath of 
September 11, reporters ask more adversarial questions than in any other phase of 
questioning surrounding the attacks.  Overall, features of initiative, directness, 
assertiveness, and hostility in questions increase, though negatively formulated questions, 
questions tilted to be potentially damaging to Bush, and questions asking for an account 
of Bush’s actions or decisions are more deferential.  This indicates the press corps asks 
tough questions, but it does not question the president’s personal actions or agenda more 
in the weeks following September 11 than in any other questioning phase.   
 Hypothesis Two, speculating questions asked on September 11 to be most 
deferential, proves positive.  The press shows, however, more initiative than deference in 
the form of multiple questions and cascades.  This could be an indicator of curiosity and 
the desire to clarify the known facts of the morning’s attacks on the Pentagon and World 
Trade Center.  Other-referencing question frames, which ask the speaker if he/she can or 
will comment on a reporter’s question, are at their most adversarial level of all the 
questioning phases on September 11.  Though the difference is less than 3 percent, it 
indicates adversarial relations in the form of directness.  All assertive and hostility 
questions are at their deferential peak, and initiative and directness questions also are 
highly deferential. 
 Hypothesis Three states adversarial relations will increase from September 11 to 
the direct aftermath, and will increase again from the weeks after September to 
December.  This hypothesis is not supported.  With the exceptions of supercomplex and 
follow-up questions exhibiting initiative, prefaced hostility questions, and assertive 
innocuous tilts, no other question design features follow this pattern.  Almost three-
fourths of all press briefing questions peak in the 9/11 aftermath and decrease in the post-
September 11 questioning phase. 
 Hypothesis Four is inconclusive.  It is not the case that most adversarial questions 
are foreign policy related and reference a member of Congress or another powerful 
political actor with contrasting views to the president.  This hypothesis has a flaw 
because it relates to subject matter.  All questions demonstrate some degree of adversarial 
relations according to this methodology, with the arguable exception of simple questions 
with self- and other-referencing frames.  Therefore, the number of foreign policy and 
Congress questions demonstrating adversarial relations may be directly proportional to 
the number of foreign policy and Congress questions asked in a given press briefing.  On 
the flip side, the opposite may be true.  All questions in the sample are analyzed for 
adversarial content, so all questions—foreign policy, Congress, or other—have an equal 
shot at being more adversarial depending on how frequently they are asked.  If reporters 
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ask more foreign affairs questions, a higher percentage of foreign affairs questions will be 
adversarial.  But if reporters ask more domestic affairs questions, more domestic affairs 
questions will be adversarial.  Statistically, a significant relationship between foreign 
policy and Congress questions was found only for accountability questions and partly for 
question cascades.  The other eight question design features showed no significant 
relationship. 
 In the post-September 11 questioning phase, many design features are more than 
50 percent comprised of foreign policy issues.  Supercomplex questions and question 
cascades showing initiative, yes-no questions without a tilt and with a hostile tilt showing 
assertiveness, and global and preface hostility questions exhibiting hostility all 
predominately deal with foreign issues.  Prefaced questions and multiple questions are 
within 2 percent of having foreign issues as a majority of their questions during this 
phase.  No other question phases approach these significant results for the December 
press-briefing questions, which suggests reporters ask a higher percentage of foreign 
policy questions in December than before September 11.   
 To reexamine the significance of foreign policy issues and questions referencing 
Congress or other powerful political actors with statements in contrast to the president’s 
deeds or views, the researcher examines the five question-type foundations: simple, 
prefaced, multiple, supercomplex, and follow-up questions.  Each question is labeled as 
one of these foundations in addition to having several other adversarial design features.  
Comparing these qualities against each other, in general more of the complex questions—
prefaced, multiple, supercomplex, and follow-ups—have higher percentages of foreign 
and Congress questions than do the less complex simple questions.  Though no question 
design feature holds a majority of foreign policy and/or Congress-referencing questions, 
with the exception of the aforementioned cases, this finding may suggest there is a 
greater significance between adversarial content and foreign and Congress questions than 
Hypothesis Four recognizes.    This suggests a possible alternative scenario to explain the 
study’s findings, which is press questions in this sample may not increase or decrease in 
adversarial relations solely because of events resulting from the national crisis on 
September 11, 2001.   
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CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSION 
 
  
 
 Modern American society defines the media’s role in many ways, attempting to 
capture the essence of what a journalist should be or do.  Combined qualities of a 
watchdog, gatekeeper, informer, opportunist, agenda setter, entertainer, messenger, and 
government adversary create an ideal image ripe for keeping the government in check, 
telling the public what it needs to know about national and foreign affairs, and updating it 
on the latest celebrity gossip, traffic, and weather.  The media’s cooperation with the 
White House regarding suppression of the bin Laden tapes resurrected a new importance 
to the role of the press.  With this renewed attention, a controversial argument is brewing: 
Should newscasters and reporters suppress or express their personal patriotic sentiments 
in news coverage?  Unbiased reporting is impossible, but balanced reporting is an 
attainable ideal.  According to Regina Lawrence in her essay, “How Does the First 
Amendment Matter to the Daily Construction of News?,” “the main news gate remains 
pretty firmly shut against voices that deeply oppose basic American values related to 
democracy” (Lawrence, 2003).    
Maintaining congenial yet skeptical relations with government officials allows the 
media to monitor the government’s actions, protect democracy, and serve the public by 
protecting a balanced news agenda from which individuals may determine their political 
views and opinions.  If the media abandon their adversarial role, ideological as it may be, 
an imbalance occurs in American democratic society that endangers First Amendment 
freedoms.  Without the media actively questioning the president’s motives and actions, 
the president’s persuasion power can become overly influential.  The September 11 
attacks and the recent wars on terrorism raise issues of what adversarial suspension and 
increased deference between the president and the media can do to American news 
agendas, and ultimately American democracy.   
 The protection and maintenance of First Amendment freedoms for the press 
involves a delicate balancing act: The media must gain the public’s confidence in their 
autonomy from government while maintaining amiable relations with powerful political 
sources to gain access to the information the public wants.  With freedom comes 
obligations, and because the press is given a special place in society, it may be reasonable 
to expect the press to perform certain social responsibilities.  The watchdog role isn’t 
dead.  The adversarial content in the Fleischer press briefing questions indicates the press 
was on its toes in the aftermath of September 11.  Even if Bush was controlling the news 
agenda with his repeated patriotic frames (Entman, 2003), behind the scenes the media 
were not passively accepting the administration’s views and statements without question.   
 This study sought to prove that the events of a national crises such as September 
11 would have an effect on the press-powerful political source relationship.  By analyzing 
questions asked during White House press briefings before and after the event, this 
study’s findings established that relations did change following September 11.  They 
results, however, are opposite from what was anticipated.  Contrary to many reports, this 
study found the press to be more aggressive than normal in their questioning in the two-
three weeks following the attacks.  This information begs bigger questions, which may 
serve for continuing areas of study:  If members of the White House Press Corps were 
 41
asking more adversarial questions following September 11, why didn’t their increased 
adversarial tone make it into the headlines of national newspapers, broadcasts, and 
magazines?  Is there a correlation between questions the media ask sources and what gets 
into the news?  Does the press question’s agenda have any bearing on the news agenda? 
 This study is one of the first to use Clayman and Heritage’s (2002) methodology 
for measuring adversarial and deferential dimensions in press questions, and the results of 
this thesis helps to support the validity and workability of their methodology.  Because 
the methodology is lengthy and is essentially 10 different studies under the guise of one 
study, it would be helpful to have an easier way to look at the 10 design features and 
detect commonalities.  For example, if the design features were all measured out of the 
same total, the interpretation of the results would have a more apparently evident 
meaning to the reader and/or future researcher.  Overall, the method has proved to be a 
useful and innovative tool in determining the initiative, directness, assertiveness, and 
hostility press members employ to obtain information from their sources through the art 
of the question. 
 
 
 42
REFERENCES 
 
Bennett, W. L.  (1990).  Toward a theory of press-state relations in the United States 
 [Electronic version].  Journal of Communication, 40, 103-125. 
 
Bleske, G. L.  (1995, August).  Schematic frames and reader learning: The effect of 
 headlines.   Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Communication Theory 
 and Methodology Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and 
 Mass Communication, Washington, D.C. 
 
Blumler, J., & Gurevitch, M.  (1981).  Politicians and the press: An essay on role  
relationships.  In D. Nimmo & K. Sanders (Eds.), Handbook of political 
communication (pp.467-493).  Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
 
Carter, B., & Barringer, F.  (2001, October 11).  Networks agree to U.S. request to edit 
 future bin Laden tapes.  New York Times, pp. A1.  Retrieved February 27, 2004, 
 from http://seg802.ocs.lsu.edu:2084/universe/printdoc. 
 
Casey, D.  (2002, January/February).  Red, white and Bush [Electronic version].  Foreign 
 Policy, 129, 90-91.   
 
Cater, D.  (1959).  The fourth branch of government.  New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Clayman, S. & Heritage, J.  (2002).  The news interview: Journalists and public figures 
 on the air.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Clayman, S. & Heritage, J.  (2002).  Questioning presidents: Journalistic deference and 
 adversarialness in the press conferences of U.S. Presidents Eisenhower and 
 Reagan [Electronic version].  Journal of Communication, 52, 749-775.   
 
Coleman, R.  (1997).  The intellectual antecedents of public journalism.”  Journal of 
 Communication Inquiry, 21, 60-76. 
 
Conniff, R.  (2002, January).  Patriot games.  The Progressive.  Retrieved April 15, 2004 
 from http://www.findarticles.com.  
 
Entman, R. M. (2003).  Cascading activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame after 
 9/11.  Political Communication, 20, 415-432. 
 
Entman, R. M. (1993).  Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm.  Journal 
 of Communication, 43, 51-58. 
 
Epstein, L., & Segal, J. A.  (2000).  Measuring issue salience.  American Journal of 
 Political Science, 44, 66-83. 
 
 43
Farhi, P.  (2001, September 22).  WJLA’s correction: Pull Maher.  Washington Post 
 Online, pp. C7.  Retrieved January 22, 2004, from 
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentI
 d=A71422001Sep21&notFound=true.  
 
Friedman, T.  (2001a, October 5).  Yes, but what?  The New York Times, pp. A27. 
 
Friedman, T.  (2001b, October 30).  Drilling for tolerance.  New York Times, pp. A17. 
 
Gans, H.  (1979).  Deciding what’s news: A study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly  
News, Newsweek and Time.  New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Gardels, N. (1995, Spring).  Is there a liberal bias in the media?  New Perspectives 
 Quarterly, 12, 23-26. 
 
Gregg, II, G. L.  (2003, Summer).  Crisis leadership: The symbiotic transformation of the 
 Bush presidency [Electronic version].  Perspectives on Political Science, 32, 143-
 149. 
 
Grossman, M. B., & Rourke, F. E.  (1976).  The media and the presidency: An exchange 
 analysis.  Political Science Quarterly, 91, 455-470. 
 
Hackett, R. A.  (1984).  Decline of a paradigm?  Bias and objectivity in news media 
 studies.  In M. Gurevitch and M. R. Levy (Eds.), Mass Communication Yearbook 
 Review, vol. 5, pp. 251-274.  Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Hagar, G., & Sullivan, T.  (1994, November).  President-centered and presidency-
 centered explanations of presidential public activity [Electronic version] 
 American Journal of Political Science, 38, 1079-1103. 
 
Halperin, M., Wilner, E., & Ambinder, M.  (2003, October 24).  Practice makes you 
 perfect if you practice the right thing.  Abcnews.com. 
 
Hart, P, & Ackerman, S.  (2001, November/December).  Patriotism and censorship.  
 Extra!  Retrieved January 22, 2004, from http://www.fair.org/extra/0111/ 
 patriotism-and-censorship.html.  
 
Herbst, S.  (1998).  Reading public opinion: How political actors view the democratic 
 process.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hersh, S.  (2002, October 22).  King’s ransom.  New Yorker, pp. 35. 
 
Hetherington, M. J., & Nelson, M.  (2003, January)  Anatomy of a Rally effect: George 
 W. Bush and the war on terrorism.  PS: Political Science and Politics.  Retrieved 
 April 25, 2004 from www.apsanet.org/PS/jan03/hetherington.cfm  
 44
Insana, R. (2003, September/October).  9/11/03 the press moves on, for better or for 
 worse.  Columbia Journalism Review, 42, 7. 
 
Kernell, S.  (1997).  Going public: New strategies of presidential leadership.  3rd ed.  San  
Diego: CQ Press. 
 
Konner, J.  (2002, January 9).  Media’s patriotism provides a shield for Bush.  Newsday 
 [Long Island] [Electronic version], pp. A31.   
 
Lawrence, R.  (2003, March).  How does the First Amendment matter to the daily 
 construction of news?  Paper presented at the Breaux Symposium, Louisiana State 
 University, Baton Rouge, LA. 
 
Leigh, R. D. (Ed.).  (1947).  A free and responsible press.  Chicago: The University of 
 Chicago Press. 
 
Lippmann, W.  (1922).  Public opinion.  New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Loersch, A.  (2001, October).  When patriotism and compassion clash with media 
 pluralism [Electronic version].  Media Insight Central Asia, 20, 32-38. 
 
Manheim, J. B.  (1979, February).  The honeymoon’s over: The news conference and the 
 development of presidential style [Electronic version].  The Journal of Politics, 
 40, 55-74. 
 
Marks, J., & Marks, S. C.  (1999, February 9).  Common ground is possible.  Christian 
 Science Monitor, 91, 11. 
 
McCombs, M., & Bell  T. (1996).  The agenda-setting role of mass communication.  In 
 M.B. Salwen & Don W. Stacks (Eds.), An integrated approach to communication 
 theory and research (pp. 93-110).  Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
 Associates.  
 
Morin, R.  (2001, September 24-30).  He has the public's approval.  Washington Post 
 National Weekly Edition, pp. 8. 
 
Mueller, J.E. (1973). War, presidents and public opinion. New York: John Wiley. 
 
Severin, W., & Tankard, J.  (1997)  Communication theories: Origins, methods, and uses 
 in mass media  (4th ed.).  White Plains: Longman. 
 
Schudson, M.  (2003, March).  If you start with autonomous journalists, will you end up 
 with a free press?  Or why we need an unlovable press.  Paper presented at the 
 Breaux Symposium, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA. 
 
 45
Shaw, D. L. & Martin, S. E.  (Eds.).  (1992).  The function of mass media agenda setting.  
 Journalism Quarterly, 69, 902-920.   
 
Smith, C.  (1990)  Presidential press conferences: A critical approach.  New York:  
 Praeger. 
 
Tankard, J. W., Hendrickson, L., Silberman, J., Bliss, K., & Ghanem, S.  (1991).  Media 
 frames: Approaches to conceptualization and measurement.  Paper presented at 
 the annual meeting of the Communication Theory and Methodology Division of 
 the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Boston, 
 August. 
 
Tuchman, G.  (1977).  The exception proves the rule: The study of routine news 
 practices.  In P. M. Hirsh & P. V. Miller (Eds.),  Strategies for communication 
 research, (pp. 43-63).  Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Wanta, W., & Miller, R. E.  (1995).  Sources of the pubic agenda: The president-press-
 public relationship.  Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International 
 Communication Association, Albuquerque. 
 
Weaver, D. H.  (1977).  Political issues and voter need for orientation.  In D. L. Shaw and 
 M. E. McCombs (Eds.), The emergence of American political issues: The agenda-
 setting function of the press, pp. 107-119.  St. Paul, Minn.: West.   
 
Yagade, A., and Dozier, D. M.  (1990).  The media agenda-setting effect of concrete 
 versus abstract issues.  Journalism Quarterly, 67: 3-10. 
 
Zucker, H. G. (1978).  The variable nature of news media influence.  In B. D. Ruben, 
 (Ed.), Communication yearbook, vol. 2, pp. 225-240.  New Brunswick, N.J.: 
 Transaction. 
 
 46
APPENDIX A: PRESS QUESTION CODE SHEET 
 
 
  A.  Press Briefing Date __________________________________________   
 
 
  B.  General Press Briefing Details 
  
   1.  Total number of questions     ______ 
   2.  Total number of questioning turns    ______ 
   3.  Total number of prefaced statements   ______ 
  
 
  C.  Question Design Features  Total  Foreign Q Domestic Q CQ   
  
  1.  Question Complexity  ______ ______ ______ ____ 
   a. Simple   ______ ______ ______ ____ 
   b. Prefaced   ______ ______ ______ ____ 
   c. Multiple   ______ ______ ______ ____ 
   d. Supercomplex  ______ ______ ______ ____ 
  2.  Question Cascades    ______  ______ ______ ____  
  3.  Follow-up Questions  ______ ______ ______ ____ 
              
  4.  OR Question Frames  ______ ______ ______ ____ 
   a. Ability   ______ ______  ______  ____ 
   b. Willing   ______ ______  ______  ____ 
  5.  SR Question Frames  ______ ______  ______  ____ 
   a. Wonder   ______ ______  ______  ____  
   b. Like/want   ______ ______  ______  ____ 
  c. Can/may    ______ ______  ______  ____  
               
  6.  Preface Tilt   ______  ______  ______  ____ 
   a. Innocuous   ______ ______  ______  ____ 
   b. Hostile   ______ ______  ______  ____ 
   c. No Tilt   ______ ______  ______  ____ 
   d. No Preface   ______ ______  ______  ____ 
  7.  Negatively Formulated Questions ______ ______  ______  ____   
               
  8.  Preface Hostility    ______ ______  ______  ____ 
   a. Preface Focus of Q  ______ ______  ______  ____  
   b. Preface Presupposed by Q ______ ______  ______  ____ 
  9.  Global Hostility   ______ ______  ______  ____  
  10.  Accountability Questions ______ ______  ______  ____ 
   a. Why did he   ______ ______  ______  ____ 
   b. How could he  ______ ______  ______  ____ 
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APPENDIX B: CODE SHEET INSTRUCTIONS  
 
A.  Press Briefing Date 
 Month and day of press briefing. 
 
B.  General Press Briefing Details 
 1.  Total number of questions: All questions asked by reporters during all 
 questioning turns in the press briefing. 
  
 2.  Total number of questioning turns: A questioning turn is defined when Ari 
 Fleischer responds to a reporter’s question, set of questions, or combination of 
 questions and prefatory statements. 
  
 3.  Total Number of prefatory statements: All statements reporters made 
 preceding and in relation to questions asked during all questioning turns in the 
 press briefing. 
 
C.  Question Design Features1 
 1.  Question Complexity: Indicated by a simple, prefaced, multiple, or 
 supercomplex  question in each questioning turn. 
  a. Simple: One-sentenced question 
  b. Prefaced: Elaborated preliminary statement to a question 
  c. Multiple: More than one question 
  d. Supercomplex: Both prefaced statements and multiple questions 
  
 2.  Question Cascade: A multiple questioning turn asking virtually the same 
 question.  Question cascades are measured out of the total number of questions, 
 not the total number of questioning turns. 
  
 3.  Follow-up Question: A reporter’s successive turn to talk or by a reporter 
 declining to accept an adequate response by the interviewee.  Follow-ups 
 combined with simple, prefaced, multiple, and supercomplex questions equal the 
 total number of questioning turns. 
  
 4.  Other-Referencing Question Frames: Reference to the interviewee’s ability 
 or willingness to answer a question.  Measured out of the total number of 
 questions. 
  a. Ability: Can/could you + comment, explain, or tell? 
  b. Willingness: Will/would you + comment, explain, or tell? 
  
 
            
                                                 
1 The 10 question design features are tallied by the total number of adversarial features represented in the 
press briefing.  They further are grouped by total number of adversarial features represented in foreign 
affairs questions, in domestic affairs questions, and in questions referencing differences of opinion between 
the President and members of Congress.  
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 5.  Self-Referencing Question Frames: Reference to the journalist’s intentions, 
 motivations, or capacity to ask a question.  Measured out of the total number of 
 questions. 
  a. I wonder/ I wondered/ I was wondering: Question contains this phrase 
  b. I would like to ask/ I want to ask: Question contains this phrase 
  c. Can I ask/ Could I ask/ May I ask: Question contains this phrase 
 
 6.  Preface Tilt: Yes-no question involving a prefatory statement “tilted” in 
 favor of either a yes or no answer.  Measured out of the total number of yes-no 
 questions. 
  a. Innocuous tilt: Non-damaging prefatory tilt, which may be favorable  
  to the president  
  b. Hostile tilt:  Potentially damaging prefatory tilt against the president 
  c. No tilt: Neutral prefatory statement identifying an issue without   
  favoring a yes or no answer 
  d. No preface: Yes-no question without a prefatory statement 
 
 7.  Negatively Formulated Question: Yes-no question involving a tilt in the 
 question itself in favor of a yes or no answer.  These questions beginning with 
 phrases like isn’t it, aren’t you, or don’t you think that.  Measured out of the total 
 number of yes-no questions. 
 
 8.  Preface Hostility: Overly critical remarks of the president or his 
 administration in question prefaces.  Measured out of total number of prefatory 
 statements. 
  a. Preface Focus of Q: Hostile preface is the focus of the question, which  
  invites the interviewee to comment 
  b. Preface Presupposed by Q: Question invites interviewee to respond to  
  inferences made from the hostile preface, but does invite the interviewee  
  to respond to the actual prefatory statement. 
 
 9.  Global Hostility: To be globally hostile, both prefaced questions and the 
 questions themselves must embody hostility.  Follow-up questions directly 
 challenging or plainly disagreeing with interviewee/president are can also be 
 globally hostile.  Measured out of total number of questions. 
 
 10.  Accountability Questions:  Ask the interviewee to explain the president has 
 taken a certain course of action.  Measured by the total number of  questions. 
  a. Why did he2: Question contains this phrase 
  b. How could he/ how can he/ how is it possible for him to: Question  
  contains this phrase 
                                                 
2 Because the press secretary conducts the press briefings, “you” has been changed to “he” to reference 
President Bush. 
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APPENDIX C: TOTAL NUMBER OF QUESTIONS, TOTAL NUMBER OF 
QUESTIONING TURNS, AND TOTAL NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WITH 
PREFATORY STATEMENTS 
 
  Total # of Questions Total # of Questioning Turns Total # of Prefaced Questions 
6-Jun 7 6 3 
13-Jun 72 67 29 
19-Jun 84 65 17 
20-Jun 110 88 38 
26-Jun 91 79 30 
27-Jun 66 54 19 
28-Jun 108 90 32 
29-Jun 104 87 25 
4-Sep 59 50 13 
6-Sep 39 28 7 
7-Sep 92 77 40 
Pre-9/11 832 691 253 
        
11-a-Sep 15 14 0 
11-b-Sep 25 17 2 
9/11 40 31 2 
        
12-Sep 111 82 35 
13-Sep 100 68 32 
15-Sep 64 54 24 
17-Sep 83 62 33 
18-Sep 83 59 34 
19-Sep 76 60 32 
21-Sep 98 73 25 
24-Sep 69 53 23 
25-Sep 55 43 23 
26-Sep 88 62 21 
28-Sep 90 74 30 
9/11 Aftermath 917 690 312 
        
3-Dec 97 60 25 
4-Dec 14 10 0 
5-Dec 81 60 24 
6-Dec 96 73 14 
10-Dec 91 65 28 
12-Dec 98 63 19 
13-Dec 71 55 22 
14-Dec 70 51 17 
17-Dec 88 60 18 
18-Dec 66 53 19 
19-Dec 69 60 18 
20-Dec 63 48 18 
21-Dec 61 47 15 
Post-9/11 965 705 237 
        
Total 2,754 2,117 804 
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APPENDIX D: INITIATIVE (PART I) TOTAL NUMBERS: 
TOTAL QUESTION COMPLEXITY (QC)  
 
  QC F C Simple F C Prefaced F C Multiple F C Super F C 
6-Jun 6 6 0 3 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
13-Jun 45 10 3 21 4 2 18 4 0 2 1 0 4 2 0 
19-Jun 51 17 4 26 7 4 13 4 3 9 4 3 3 2 0 
20-Jun 64 34 2 25 14 0 20 10 2 8 4 0 11 6 0 
26-Jun 59 30 4 27 13 0 20 11 3 6 5 1 6 1 0 
27-Jun 42 8 10 20 2 3 10 2 4 6 2 2 6 2 2 
28-Jun 68 11 16 33 7 5 18 2 7 8 0 3 9 2 1 
29-Jun 68 6 5 33 3 1 21 4 2 11 0 0 3 0 2 
4-Sep 43 7 12 25 3 6 11 3 3 6 1 2 1 0 1 
6-Sep 25 8 0 11 3 0 6 3 0 7 2 0 1 0 0 
7-Sep 60 1 9 32 0 0 17 0 6 6 1 0 5 0 3 
Pre-9/11 531 139 65 256 59 21 156 45 30 69 20 11 50 15 10 
                        
11-a-Sep 14 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11-b-Sep 15 0 0 7 0 0 2 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
9/11 29 0 0 20 0 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
                                
12-Sep 74 8 4 27 4 0 26 3 2 14 0 1 7 1 1 
13-Sep 55 6 5 11 0 2 19 2 2 14 1 0 11 3 1 
15-Sep 44 6 0 21 1 0 15 4 0 6 1 0 2 0 0 
17-Sep 47 4 2 10 1 0 19 2 0 7 0 0 11 1 2 
18-Sep 49 11 3 14 3 0 19 4 1 7 1 0 9 3 2 
19-Sep 46 11 2 11 2 0 20 4 1 6 0 0 9 5 1 
21-Sep 51 10 1 23 3 0 12 3 1 10 2 0 6 2 0 
24-Sep 41 15 0 16 6 0 15 6 0 4 0 0 6 3 0 
25-Sep 32 12 4 10 2 1 15 7 2 4 3 1 3 0 0 
26-Sep 47 15 6 15 5 0 14 3 4 13 6 2 5 1 0 
28-Sep 48 7 2 14 1 0 19 1 2 8 3 0 7 2 0 
9/11 
Aftermath 534 105 29 172 28 3 193 39 15 93 17 4 76 21 7 
                                
3-Dec 44 29 5 11 7 0 17 14 3 9 3 2 7 5 0 
4-Dec 8 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
5-Dec 42 15 8 16 4 2 10 1 4 4 3 0 12 7 2 
6-Dec 43 12 4 19 4 1 5 1 2 12 3 1 7 4 0 
10-Dec 42 21 5 10 3 1 15 7 3 7 5 0 10 6 1 
12-Dec 38 27 4 9 5 1 9 8 2 13 9 0 7 5 2 
13-Dec 40 38 1 16 14 1 11 11 0 6 6 0 7 7 0 
14-Dec 30 15 2 11 1 1 8 6 0 5 5 0 6 3 1 
17-Dec 34 13 5 10 3 1 6 2 2 13 5 1 5 3 1 
18-Dec 30 6 11 12 2 4 11 2 5 3 1 1 4 1 1 
19-Dec 33 2 18 15 0 7 10 1 6 4 1 2 4 0 3 
20-Dec 32 3 9 11 0 2 11 2 3 6 0 3 4 1 1 
21-Dec 29 10 6 13 3 1 8 4 4 3 2 0 5 1 1 
Post-9/11 445 191 78 157 46 22 121 59 34 89 43 10 78 43 13 
                        
Total 1,539 435 172 605 133 46 472 143 79 258 80 25 204 79 30 
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APPENDIX E: INITIATIVE (I) PERCENTS: 
QUESTION COMPLEXITY 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Question 
Complexity Simple% Prefaced% Multiple% Super% 
6-Jun 6 50 33.3 0 16.7 
13-Jun 45 46.7 39.1 4.4 8.7 
19-Jun 51 47.8 25.5 17.6 5.9 
20-Jun 64 39.1 31.3 12.5 17.2 
26-Jun 59 45.8 33.9 10.2 10.2 
27-Jun 41 46.3 23.8 14.3 14.3 
28-Jun 68 48.5 26.5 11.8 13.2 
29-Jun 67 47.7 31.3 16.4 4.5 
4-Sep 43 58.1 25.6 14 2.3 
6-Sep 25 44 24 28 4 
7-Sep 60 33.3 28.3 10 8.3 
Pre-9/11 529 48.2 29.4 13 9.4 
   
11-a-Sep 14 92.9 0 7.1 0 
11-b-Sep 15 46.7 13.3 40 0 
9/11 29 67 6.9 24.1 0 
       
12-Sep 74 36.5 35.1 18.9 9.5 
13-Sep 55 20 34.5 25.5 20 
15-Sep 44 47.7 34.1 13.6 4.5 
17-Sep 47 21.3 40.4 14.9 23.4 
18-Sep 49 28.6 38.8 14.3 18.4 
19-Sep 46 23.9 43.5 13 19.6 
21-Sep 51 45.1 23.5 19.6 11.8 
24-Sep 41 39 36.6 9.8 14.6 
25-Sep 32 31.3 46.8 12.5 9.4 
26-Sep 47 31.9 29.8 27.7 10.6 
28-Sep 48 29.2 39.6 16.7 14.6 
9/11 
Aftermath 534 32.2 36.1 17.4 14.2 
        
3-Dec 44 25 38.6 20.5 15.9 
4-Dec 8 50 0 50 0 
5-Dec 42 33.3 23.8 9.5 28.6 
6-Dec 43 44.2 11.6 27.9 16.3 
10-Dec 42 23.7 35.7 16.7 23.8 
12-Dec 38 23.7 23.7 34.2 18.4 
13-Dec 40 40 27.5 20 17.5 
14-Dec 30 36.7 26.7 16.7 20 
17-Dec 34 29.4 17.6 38.2 14.7 
18-Dec 30 40 36.7 10 13.3 
19-Dec 33 45.5 30.3 12.1 12.1 
20-Dec 32 34.4 34.4 18.8 12.5 
21-Dec 29 44.8 27.6 10.3 17.2 
Post-9/11 445 35.3 27.2 20 17.5 
    
Total 1,539 39.3 30.7 16.8 13.3 
 52
APPENDIX F: INITIATIVE (PART II) TOTAL NUMBERS: 
TOTAL QUESTION CASCADES AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS  
 
  Cascades F C Follow-Up  Questions F C 
6-Jun 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13-Jun 1 0 0 21 2 2 
19-Jun 6 3 0 14 1 1 
20-Jun 3 1 0 24 10 0 
26-Jun 1 1 0 20 14 0 
27-Jun 3 2 1 12 3 1 
28-Jun 4 0 1 22 0 8 
29-Jun 2 0 0 20 0 1 
4-Sep 0 0 0 7 0 0 
6-Sep 3 0 0 3 1 0 
7-Sep 3 0 0 17 0 2 
Pre-9/11 26 7 2 160 31 15 
          
11-a-Sep 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11-b-Sep 2 0 0 2 0 0 
9/11 2 0 0 2 0 0 
              
12-Sep 6 0 0 8 0 1 
13-Sep 6 1 0 13 0 0 
15-Sep 0 0 0 10 3 0 
17-Sep 2 0 0 15 0 1 
18-Sep 1 0 0 10 1 0 
19-Sep 4 0 0 14 2 0 
21-Sep 5 0 0 22 4 0 
24-Sep 3 1 0 12 0 0 
25-Sep 3 1 1 11 3 0 
26-Sep 8 4 0 15 3 0 
28-Sep 2 0 0 26 3 1 
9/11 Aftermath 40 7 1 156 19 3 
              
3-Dec 6 4 0 16 11 0 
4-Dec 2 0 0 2 0 0 
5-Dec 2 1 0 18 6 2 
6-Dec 4 1 0 30 7 1 
10-Dec 4 4 0 23 14 1 
12-Dec 9 6 0 25 18 5 
13-Dec 1 1 0 15 15 0 
14-Dec 7 5 0 21 11 4 
17-Dec 2 1 0 26 14 2 
18-Dec 2 0 1 23 3 8 
19-Dec 1 0 1 27 2 9 
20-Dec 5 0 4 16 2 8 
21-Dec 3 2 1 18 9 6 
Post-9/11 48 25 7 260 112 46 
              
Total 116 39 10 578 162 64 
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APPENDIX G: INITIATIVE (II) PERCENTS: 
QUESTION CASCADES AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  Total Questions Cascades% 
Questioning 
Turns Follow-ups% 
6-Jun 7 0 6 0 
13-Jun 72 1.4 67 32.8 
19-Jun 84 7.1 65 21.5 
20-Jun 110 2.7 88 27.3 
26-Jun 91 1.1 79 25.3 
27-Jun 66 4.5 54 24.1 
28-Jun 108 3.7 90 24.4 
29-Jun 104 1.9 87 23 
4-Sep 59 0 50 14 
6-Sep 39 7.7 28 10.7 
7-Sep 92 3.3 77 22.1 
Pre-9/11 832 3.1 691 23.2 
       
11-a-Sep 15 0 14 0 
11-b-Sep 25 8 17 11.8 
9/11 40 5 31 6.5 
        
12-Sep 111 5.4 82 9.8 
13-Sep 100 6 68 19.1 
15-Sep 64 0 54 18.5 
17-Sep 83 2.4 62 24.2 
18-Sep 83 1.2 59 16.9 
19-Sep 76 5.3 60 23.3 
21-Sep 98 5.1 73 30.1 
24-Sep 69 4.3 53 22.6 
25-Sep 55 5.5 43 25.6 
26-Sep 88 9.1 62 24.2 
28-Sep 90 2.2 74 35.1 
9/11 Aftermath 917 4.4 690 22.6 
        
3-Dec 97 6.2 60 26.7 
4-Dec 14 14.3 10 20 
5-Dec 81 2.5 60 30 
6-Dec 96 4.2 73 41.1 
10-Dec 91 4.4 65 35.4 
12-Dec 98 9.2 63 39.7 
13-Dec 71 1.4 55 27.3 
14-Dec 70 10 51 41.2 
17-Dec 88 2.3 60 43.3 
18-Dec 66 3 53 43.4 
19-Dec 69 1.4 60 45 
20-Dec 63 7.9 48 33.3 
21-Dec 61 4.9 47 38.3 
Post-9/11 965 5 705 36.9 
       
Total 2,754 4.2 2,117 27.3 
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APPENDIX H: DIRECTNESS TOTAL NUMBERS: 
OTHER-REFERENCING FRAMES (OR) & SELF-REFERENCING FRAMES (SR) 
 
 OR F C Ability Willing SR F C Wonder Like/want Can/may 
6-Jun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13-Jun 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 
19-Jun 7 2 0 5 2 6 1 1 2 1 3 
20-Jun 6 4 0 3 3 7 4 0 2 1 4 
26-Jun 3 1 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 
27-Jun 1 0 1 1 0 3 2 0 1 0 2 
28-Jun 4 0 0 4 0 5 1 0 1 0 4 
29-Jun 7 1 0 5 2 3 0 1 1 0 2 
4-Sep 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
6-Sep 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7-Sep 7 1 0 6 1 4 0 1 1 0 3 
Pre-9/11 42 11 2 30 12 33 10 3 10 2 21 
            
11-a-Sep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11-b-Sep 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9/11 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
            
12-Sep 9 0 0 9 0 8 0 1 2 0 6 
13-Sep 8 0 0 8 0 7 1 1 3 0 4 
15-Sep 8 2 0 8 0 5 2 0 5 0 0 
17-Sep 9 1 0 9 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
18-Sep 3 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 2 0 1 
19-Sep 10 3 3 8 2 5 2 0 1 1 3 
21-Sep 5 0 0 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 
24-Sep 4 1 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
25-Sep 4 1 1 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 3 
26-Sep 2 0 0 1 1 4 1 0 0 0 4 
28-Sep 3 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 
9/11 
Aftermath 65 8 4 59 6 43 7 2 13 2 28 
            
3-Dec 7 5 0 7 0 6 5 0 0 1 5 
4-Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5-Dec 6 1 1 6 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 
6-Dec 8 0 1 8 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 
10-Dec 8 7 0 8 0 7 2 1 3 0 4 
12-Dec 7 5 2 7 0 7 4 3 1 1 5 
13-Dec 6 0 0 6 0 5 5 0 0 1 4 
14-Dec 4 4 0 2 2 4 1 0 1 0 3 
17-Dec 4 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18-Dec 4 0 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
19-Dec 3 0 1 3 0 3 0 1 0 0 3 
20-Dec 8 1 2 8 0 4 0 0 0 2 2 
21-Dec 5 2 1 5 0 4 2 1 1 1 2 
Post-9/11 70 27 12 67 3 45 21 6 8 6 31 
            
Total 179 46 18 157 22 121 61 11 31 10 80 
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APPENDIX I: DIRECTNESS PERCENTS: 
OTHER-REFERENCING FRAMES & SELF-REFERENCING FRAMES  
 
 Total Questions Other-Referencing% Self-Referencing% 
6-Jun 7 0 0 
13-Jun 72 2.8 2.8 
19-Jun 84 8.3 7.1 
20-Jun 110 5.5 6.4 
26-Jun 91 3.3 2.2 
27-Jun 66 1.5 4.5 
28-Jun 108 3.7 4.6 
29-Jun 104 6.7 2.9 
4-Sep 59 3.4 1.7 
6-Sep 39 7.7 0 
7-Sep 92 7.6 4.3 
Pre-9/11 832 5 4 
    
11-a-Sep 15 0 0 
11-b-Sep 25 8 0 
9/11 40 5 0 
    
12-Sep 111 8.1 7.2 
13-Sep 100 8 7 
15-Sep 64 12.5 7.8 
17-Sep 83 10.8 2.4 
18-Sep 83 3.6 3.6 
19-Sep 76 13.2 6.6 
21-Sep 98 5.1 2 
24-Sep 69 5.8 2.9 
25-Sep 55 7.3 5.5 
26-Sep 88 2.3 4.5 
28-Sep 90 3.3 2.2 
9/11 Aftermath 917 7.1 4.7 
    
3-Dec 97 7.2 6.2 
4-Dec 14 0 0 
5-Dec 81 7.4 2.5 
6-Dec 96 8.3 2.1 
10-Dec 91 8.8 7.7 
12-Dec 98 7.1 7.1 
13-Dec 71 8.5 7 
14-Dec 70 5.7 5.7 
17-Dec 88 4.5 0 
18-Dec 66 6.1 1.5 
19-Dec 69 4.3 4.3 
20-Dec 63 12.7 6.3 
21-Dec 61 8.2 6.6 
Post-9/11 965 7.3 4.7 
     
Total 2,754 6.5 4.4 
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APPENDIX J: ASSERTIVENESS TOTAL NUMBERS:   
PREFACE TILTS AND NEGATIVELY FORMULATED QUESTIONS 
 
 
Pref 
Tilt F  C Innoc  F C Hostile F C 
No 
Tilt F C 
No 
Pref F C 
Neg. 
Q F C 
6-Jun 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
13-Jun 46 9 4 0 1 0 11 2 0 11 2 2 24 4 2 7 0 0 
19-Jun 56 15 4 0 1 1 9 2 1 14 5 2 33 7 0 1 0 0 
20-Jun 60 26 0 2 0 0 7 3 0 14 6 0 37 17 0 0 0 0 
26-Jun 54 32 4 1 0 1 11 6 1 9 7 0 33 19 2 3 2 0 
27-Jun 38 12 5 2 0 0 6 1 0 10 6 1 20 5 4 4 1 2 
28-Jun 26 14 13 0 0 0 6 0 1 19 7 8 1 0 0 1 0 0 
29-Jun 68 4 0 1 0 0 5 1 0 15 3 4 47 0 2 4 0 0 
4-Sep 38 5 11 1 0 0 2 0 0 13 3 7 22 2 4 2 0 0 
6-Sep 19 7 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 4 2 0 12 3 0 1 1 0 
7-Sep 52 1 8 0 0 0 12 0 7 9 0 0 31 1 1 9 0 2 
Pre-9/11 459 125 49 7 2 2 72 17 10 118 41 24 262 58 15 32 4 4 
                                      
11-a-Sep 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 
11-b-Sep 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 9/11 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 
                                      
12-Sep 81 6 8 2 1 0 9 0 3 28 3 3 42 2 2 2 0 0 
13-Sep 59 5 4 0 0 0 7 0 1 20 3 2 32 2 1 1 0 0 
15-Sep 42 10 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 16 7 0 25 3 0 1 0 0 
17-Sep 62 3 5 0 0 0 6 0 2 26 2 2 30 1 1 1 0 0 
18-Sep 52 11 4 3 1 0 3 0 1 26 8 3 20 2 0 3 2 0 
19-Sep 46 12 2 0 0 0 5 1 1 24 10 1 17 1 0 1 0 0 
21-Sep 68 14 0 1 1 0 10 2 0 16 4 0 41 7 0 13 3 0 
24-Sep 45 12 1 0 0 0 6 0 1 14 8 0 25 4 0 0 0 0 
25-Sep 42 17 5 0 0 0 10 5 1 12 2 3 20 10 1 6 3 1 
26-Sep 65 28 7 0 0 0 7 2 1 11 2 3 47 24 3 5 1 0 
28-Sep 72 13 2 0 0 0 10 2 2 20 2 0 42 9 0 1 1 0 
Aftermath 634 131 38 6 3 0 74 12 13 213 48 17 341 65 9 34 10 1 
                                      
3-Dec 59 37 5 0 0 0 5 5 0 17 12 3 37 20 2 0 0 0 
4-Dec 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
5-Dec 50 19 9 0 0 0 1 0 1 18 10 3 31 9 5 2 0 1 
6-Dec 64 21 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 15 8 2 48 13 3 4 0 0 
10-Dec 65 39 6 0 0 0 9 6 1 24 14 4 32 19 1 3 3 0 
12-Dec 73 51 4 0 0 0 5 5 0 17 13 3 51 33 1 2 2 0 
13-Dec 34 33 1 0 0 0 3 3 0 15 15 0 16 15 1 1 1 0 
14-Dec 39 20 7 0 0 0 6 4 2 9 6 0 24 10 5 2 1 1 
17-Dec 62 22 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 20 11 6 41 11 6 1 0 0 
18-Dec 44 7 17 0 0 0 7 0 4 7 2 2 30 5 11 1 0 0 
19-Dec 34 3 13 0 0 0 5 0 4 8 0 3 21 3 6 4 0 4 
20-Dec 45 4 17 0 0 0 5 2 3 17 2 5 23 0 9 0 0 0 
21-Dec 29 11 5 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 2 0 23 8 5 1 0 0 
Post-9/11 605 267 91 1 0 0 48 26 15 172 95 31 384 146 55 21 7 6 
                                      
Total 1,727 523 178 14 5 2 194 55 38 506 184 72 1,013 269 78 87 21 11 
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APPENDIX K: ASSERTIVENESS PERCENTS:   
PREFACE TILTS AND NEGATIVELY FORMULATED QUESTIONS 
 
 Pref Tilt Innocuous % Hostile% No Tilt% No Pref% Negative Q% 
6-Jun 2 0 0 0 100 0 
13-Jun 46 0 23.9 23.9 52.2 15.2 
19-Jun 56 0 16.1 25 58.9 1.8 
20-Jun 60 3.3 11.7 23.3 61.7 0 
26-Jun 54 1.9 20.4 16.7 61.1 5.6 
27-Jun 38 5.3 15.8 26.3 52.6 10.5 
28-Jun 26 00 11.5 73.1 3.8 3.8 
29-Jun 68 1.5 7.4 22.1 69.1 5.9 
4-Sep 38 2.6 5.3 34.2 57.9 5.3 
6-Sep 19 00 15.8 21.1 63.2 5.3 
7-Sep 52 00 23.1 17.3 59.6 17.3 
Pre-9/11 459 1.5 15.7 25.7 57.1 6.9 
              
11-a-Sep 11 0 0 0 100 0 
11-b-Sep 18 0 0 16.7 83.3 0 
Total 9/11 29 0 0 10.3 89.7 0 
             
12-Sep 81 2.5 11.1 34.6  51.9 2.5 
13-Sep 59 0 11.9 33.9 54.2 1.7 
15-Sep 42 0 2.4 38.1 59.5 2.4 
17-Sep 62 0 9.7 41.9 48.4 1.6 
18-Sep 52 5.8 5.8 50 38.5 5.8 
19-Sep 46 0 10.9 52.2 37 2.2 
21-Sep 68 1.5 14.7 23.5 60.3 19.1 
24-Sep 45 0 13.3 31.1 55.6 0 
25-Sep 42 0 23.8 28.6 47.6 14.3 
26-Sep 65 0 10.8 16.9 72.3 7.7 
28-Sep 72 0 13.9 27.8 58.3 1.4 
Aftermath 634 1 11.7 33.6 53.8 5.4 
              
3-Dec 59 0 8.5 28.8 62.7 0 
4-Dec 7 0 0 0 100 0 
5-Dec 50 0 2 36 62 4 
6-Dec 64 1.6 0 23.4 75 6.25 
10-Dec 65 0 13.8 36.9 49.2 4.6 
12-Dec 73 0 6.8 23.3 70 2.7 
13-Dec 34 0 8.8 44.1 4.7 2.9 
14-Dec 39 0 15.4 23.1 61.5 5.1 
17-Dec 62 0 1.6 32.3 66.1 1.6 
18-Dec 44 0 15.9 15.9 68.2 2.3 
19-Dec 34 0 14.7 23.5 61.8 11.8 
20-Dec 45 0 11.1 37.8 51.1 0 
21-Dec 29 0 13.4 17.2 79.3 3.4 
Post-9/11 605 .2 7.9 28.4 63.5 3.5 
              
Total 1,727 .8 11.2 29.3 58.7 5 
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APPENDIX L: HOSTILITY TOTAL NUMBERS: 
PREFACE HOSTILITY, GLOBAL HOSTILITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Preface Hostility F C PF PP Global F C Accountability F C Why How 
6-Jun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13-Jun 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 3 2 1 3 0 
19-Jun 2 0 0 1 1 3 1 1 2 2 0 2 0 
20-Jun 2 2 0 1 1 3 3 0 5 4 0 5 0 
26-Jun 4 3 2 3 1 3 3 0 3 2 1 2 1 
27-Jun 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28-Jun 2 0 1 1 1 4 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 
29-Jun 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 
4-Sep 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6-Sep 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7-Sep 6 0 5 4 2 7 0 3 2 0 0 2 0 
Pre-9/11 21 6 9 12 9 29 7 7 18 10 2 16 2 
11-a-Sep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11-b-Sep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11-Sep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
12-Sep 3 0 1 3 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 3 1 
13-Sep 3 0 0 2 1 5 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 
15-Sep 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
17-Sep 3 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18-Sep 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
19-Sep 5 1 1 3 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21-Sep 4 0 0 2 2 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24-Sep 3 1 1 2 1 8 1 0 3 0 0 3 0 
25-Sep 2 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26-Sep 5 1 0 3 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
28-Sep 8 3 2 3 5 10 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Aftermath 38 6 5 20 18 54 5 1 13 1 1 11 2 
  
3-Dec 3 3 0 1 2 5 5 0 1 0 0 1 0 
4-Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5-Dec 2 0 1 1 1 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
6-Dec 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
10-Dec 5 4 1 3 2 8 4 0 2 0 1 2 0 
12-Dec 2 2 0 1 1 6 6 0 2 0 1 2 0 
13-Dec 6 4 0 2 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14-Dec 5 3 2 4 1 6 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 
17-Dec 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18-Dec 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19-Dec 8 0 7 4 4 4 0 2 2 0 2 1 1 
20-Dec 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
21-Dec 4 2 4 2 2 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Post-9/11 37 19 16 19 18 50 30 8 10 1 4 9 1 
  
Total 96 31 30 51 45 133 42 16 41 12 7 36 5 
 
Preface Focus of Question (PF) 
Preface Presupposed by Question (PP) 
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APPENDIX M: HOSTILITY PERCENTS: 
PREFACE HOSTILITY, GLOBAL HOSTILITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Total Prefaced 
Questions   
Preface 
Hostility% 
            Total 
  Questioning Turns Global% 
     Total 
Questions Accountability% 
6-Jun 7 0 6 0 3 0 
13-Jun 72 6.9 67 3 29 4.2 
19-Jun 84 11.8 65 4.6 17 2.4 
20-Jun 110 13.3 88 3.4 38 4.5 
26-Jun 91 5.3 79 3.8 30 3.3 
27-Jun 66 5.3 54 1.9 19 0 
28-Jun 108 6.3 90 4.4 32 .9 
29-Jun 104 0 87 5.7 25 1.9 
4-Sep 59 0 50 2 13 0 
6-Sep 39 28.6 28 0 7 0 
7-Sep 92 15 77 9.1 40 2.2 
Pre-9/11 832 8.3 691 4.2 253 2.2 
      
11-a-Sep 15 0 14 0 0 0 
11-b-Sep 25 0 17 0 2 0 
11-Sep 40 0 31 0 2 0 
        
12-Sep 111 8.6 82 2.4 35 3.6 
13-Sep 100 9.4 68 7.4 32 2 
15-Sep 64 0 54 5.6 24 1.6 
17-Sep 83 9.1 62 4.8 33 0 
18-Sep 83 5.9 59 1.7 34 1.2 
19-Sep 76 15.6 60 11.7 32 0 
21-Sep 98 16 73 11 25 0 
24-Sep 69 13 53 15.1 23 4.3 
25-Sep 55 8.7 43 9.3 23 0 
26-Sep 88 23.8 62 4.8 21 1.1 
28-Sep 90 26.7 74 13.5 30 1.1 
Aftermath 917 12.2 690 7.8 312 1.4 
        
3-Dec 97 12 60 8.3 25 1 
4-Dec 14 0 10 0 0 0 
5-Dec 81 8.3 60 8.3 24 0 
6-Dec 96 0 73 8.1 14 1 
10-Dec 91 17.9 65 12.3 28 2.2 
12-Dec 98 10.5 63 9.5 19 2 
13-Dec 71 27.3 55 7.3 22 0 
14-Dec 70 29.4 51 11.8 17 1.4 
17-Dec 88 0 60 5 18 0 
18-Dec 66 5.3 53 3.8 19 0 
19-Dec 69 44.4 60 6.7 18 2.9 
20-Dec 63 5.6 48 2.1 18 1.6 
21-Dec 61 26.7 47 6.4 15 0 
Post-9/11 965 15.6 705 7.1 237 1 
        
Total 2,754 11.9 2,117 6.3 804 1.5 
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